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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, it became apparent to 
U.S. foreign policy makers that Northwest Africa was more than just a humanitarian 
concern. This realization led to the establishment of a multi-pronged, multi-year 
counterterrorism strategy in the Trans-Sahara region that incorporated diplomacy, 
development, and defense. Despite these unprecedented efforts, the Sahel sub-region has 
witnessed a steady rise in the presence of Salafi-Jihadist organizations since 2003. 
Furthermore, the states in the region remain incapable of defending against these 
organizations without significant outside assistance. This thesis examines the efficacy of 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region vis-à-vis African states’ capacity to explain 
the persisting Salafi-Jihadist organizations in the region. Exploring Salafi-Jihadism’s 
ideological, doctrinal, and historical aspects illustrates that these organizations have 
limited interest in political solutions. The thesis uses Nigeria, Mali, and Mauritania as 
three case studies to examine the period between 2001 and 2014 to demonstrate how 
Salafi-Jihadism’s components have successfully exploited these states’ limited capacity, 
thereby undermining U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The thesis concludes by considering 
the impacts that these conclusions will have on future counterterrorism initiatives.  
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After more than a decade of counterterrorism efforts in the Trans-Saharan regions 
of the Maghreb and the Sahel, the efficacy of U.S. policy in the region has never been 
more debatable. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to pose a significant 
regional threat, Boko Haram’s increasingly violent tactics threaten to destabilize Nigeria, 
and groups like the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and 
Ansar-al Dine exploit the weakened Malian state and operate with impunity throughout 
the region. Porous borders, weak and ineffectual governments, and socioeconomically 
disenfranchised populations make the Sahel provide an ideal breeding ground for these 
violent extremist organizations to flourish. The notion that terrorism needs to be stopped 
at its root is not unique, nor very controversial; however, the discussion of how and 
where to spend counterterrorism funds remains a hotly debated topic. This is particularly 
salient in Sub-Saharan Africa, where, according to the most recent Global Terrorism 
Index, more than 80% of terrorism is religiously motivated.1 There is ample literature 
that discusses and analyzes the design, scope, and intent of counterterrorism efforts in the 
Trans-Sahara region. Despite identifying the need to address the underlying causes that 
promote terrorism, the current counterterrorism strategy allocates few resources to 
developmental goals. The limited scope of the strategy, coupled with the nature of 
religiously motivated violent extremism, speaks to the need to develop regional security 
cooperation measures and bilateral programs designed to act as bulwarks against violent 
extremist ideologies and strengthen the region’s weak governments.  
The debate over ties with the larger global jihadi ambitions of Al-Qaeda 
notwithstanding, violent extremist groups represent a significant security challenge to 
Sahelian countries—specifically, the Salafi-Jihadist groups that employ violent means to 
achieve their objectives. The threat that these groups pose to the U.S. interests is 
explicitly mentioned in numerous policy documents from the National Security Strategy 
                                                 
1 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of 




of the United States 2010 to the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.2 Furthermore, the 
application of U.S. counterterrorism spending and the design of counterterrorism policies 
have implications for beyond the Trans-Sahara region. With the rise of ISIS in Syria and 
Iraq, the continued commitments in Afghanistan, and the counterterrorism efforts in the 
Horn of Africa, the manner in which the United States confronts terrorism is critical to its 
long-term success. As the United States struggles with continued budget deficits and 
openly “rebalancing” to the Pacific, it is crucial for policymakers to understand why 
current counterterrorism strategies have not defeated the jihadists in the Sahara and the 
Sahel, and how to align future strategies.3 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, U.S. foreign policy in 
Africa re-aligned to support the Global War on Terror with counterterrorism as the 
cornerstone. This realignment led to an unprecendented interest in the Sahel and Maghreb 
regions of Northwest Africa because of the belief that terrorists would exploit the large 
ungoverned spaces, disenfranchised populations, and insular governments. To fortify the 
region against these extremist forces, the U.S. government developed a strategy that 
incorporates aspects of diplomacy, development, and defense. As a collaborative effort, 
the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), along with other governmental agencies, seek to 
apply a whole-of-government approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism. 
The notion that countries that have strong governments, secure borders, socioeconomic 
equality, and regional bonds, are less susceptible to infiltration underscores the current 
counterterrorism strategy. Despite the multi-year, multi-agency effort, the Sahel appears 
                                                 
2 Whitehouse, National Security Strategy of the United States 2010. Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2010, 7, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; U.S. Department 
of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014, 5, 
http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.  
3 Seth G. Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists (Santa 




no stronger or less susceptible to terrorism than it did a decade earlier. The 2012 coup 
d’état in Mali and subsequent unrest in the north, the continued rise of Boko Haram in 
Nigeria, and the persistence of AQIM in the region highlight that counterterrorism efforts 
have achieved remarkably little when applied against religiously motivated violent 
extremism.  
Two themes characterize the problem addressed in this thesis: U.S. 
counterterrorism spending in the Trans-Sahara region and the rise of Salafi-Jihadism in 
Northwest Africa. Much of the existing literature that analyzes the effectiveness of U.S. 
counterterrorism spending centers on the broad theme of balancing funding for 
militarization and modernization. The general debate surrounds the question of whether 
to fund military solutions to attack the symptoms of terrorism or fund developmental 
solutions that address the root causes of terrorism.4 The theme that underscores much of 
this literature is that the Department of Defense-centered approach to countering 
terrorism is insufficient in the Sub-Saharan Africa context and needs adjustment. Budget 
reports from the Government Accountably Office (GAO) released in 2008 and 2014 
confirm the disparity in spending that exists between the agencies.5 A number of authors 
establish the theoretical framework for countering terrorism that discusses the important 
ways in which governments can interact with their citizenry to avert terrorism. A main 
theme discussed throughout the literature is the different levels at which a state can 
counter terrorism: the level of symptoms, the level of relationships, and the level of deep-
                                                 
4 Lesley Anne Warner, The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership: Building Partner Capacity to 
Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 2014), 56-7. 
http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/CRM-2014-U-007203-Final.pdf; Lilianne Kennedy-Boudali, 
“The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.” The Combating Terrorism Center: United States 
Military Academy West Point, 2007; Donovan C. Chau, “U.S. Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Understanding Costs, Cultures, and Conflicts,” Strategic Studies Institute (September 2008): 6-7. 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB821.pdf. 
5 Charles M. Johnson Jr., Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership (GAO-08-860) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
2008), 1, http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/279056.pdf. 
 4 
rooted causes of the fractured relationships that have given rise to the symptoms.6 The 
notion that a holistic approach that coordinates military measures with nonmilitary 
measures is grounded in the belief that counterterrorism strategies need to cultivate a 
sustainable approach that incorporates economic, social, and political elements. Many 
have suggested that this involves an evolution of how the U.S. employs foreign aid in 
Africa in the post-9/11 environment and how we can avoid military dominated solutions.7 
The overall argument put forth is that increased education indirectly deters terrorism by 
raising human capital, in turn, allowing a government to allot more resources directly 
toward counterterrorism efforts.  
Despite these accepted arguments, the strategy of development over defense is not 
accepted by everyone; some suggest that addressing the root causes of terrorism is too 
time consuming and that weak states need to act quickly to defeat terrorism, or they risk 
crumbling. Critiques of the development-first approach stress that prioritizing military 
measures is critical to successfully countering terrorism because of the time-sensitive 
nature of most terrorist operations.8 Furthermore, there are some, like the current Global 
Terrorism Index (GTI), that purport that there is no link between socioeconomic ills and 
terrorism, instead suggesting that the main drivers of terrorism are the perceived 
illegitimacy of the state and corruption.  
                                                 
6 Dennis J.D. Sandole, “The ‘New’ Terrorism: Causes, Conditions and Conflict Resolution.” Vienna 
Journal in Peace Research, no.121 (December 2004): 43-56; Rohan Gunaratna, “Combating Al-Qaida and 
Associated Groups.” in How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics in the West, edited by Doron 
Zimmerman and Andreas Wenger, 175-203. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007; Audrey Kurth 
Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism.” In Contending with Terrorism: 
Roots, Strategies, and Responses, edited by Michael E. Brown, 28-56. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010. 
7 William F.S. Miles, “Deploying Development to Counter Terrorism: Post-9/11 Transformation of 
U.S. Foreign Aid to Africa.” African Studies Review 55, No. 03 (October 2013): 27–60. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0002020600007198; Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler, and Javed 
Younas, “Foreign Aid as Counterterrorism Policy.” Oxford Economic Papers 63, no.3 (2011): 423-447. 
doi: 10.1093/oep/gpq030. 
8 Thomas Dempsey, “Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions.” 
Strategic Studies Institute (April 2006): 6-7. 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=649; Marc Sageman, “Fighting the 
Right War.” Paper presented at the National Defense University 2006 Joint Operations Symposium, 
Washington, D.C., March 2006. 
http://www.artisresearch.com/articles/Sageman_Fighting_the_Right_War.pdf. 
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There is also a small body of literature within the militarization versus 
modernization debate that specifically examines the compatibility of U.S. 
counterterrorism strategies vis-à-vis Islamic fundamentalism. Considering that a vast 
number of terrorist organizations operating in the Trans-Sahara are religiously motivated 
underscores the importance of the topic. The general argument put forth is that, since 
Islamic radicalism exploits disenfranchised populations and feeds on religious identity, it 
presents a different threat than secular terrorism, and therefore requires a different 
strategy—one that relies on non-coercive means.9 While making a case against that is 
similar to the case made by those who oppose military led solutions, the logic differs 
slightly from that employed in the militarization debate. In these papers, the suggestion 
that military measures are inappropriate rests on the assumption that violent measures 
will weaken the legitimacy of the state. Throughout all this literature, the importance of 
competent governments employing non-military, non-violent measures in their 
counterterrorism strategies stands as a critical component to countering Jihadist 
ideologies. 
A second theme throughout the literature suggests that U.S. counterterrorism 
policies—military or developmental—are significantly impacted by the recipient state’s 
internal functions. In this twofold argument, issues like limited government capacity, 
endemic state corruption, and state legitimacy provide arguments that strengthen violent 
ideologies.10 At the same time, these problems undermine the United States’ ability to 
develop strong, lasting partnerships that are critical for sustainable counterterrorism 
                                                 
9 Ömer Taspınar, “Fighting Radicalism, not ‘Terrorism’: Root Causes of an International Actor 
Redefined,” SAIS Review vol. XXIX, no.2 (Summer-Fall 2009): 75-86. 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2009/9/summer%20fall%20radicalism%20taspina
r/summer_fall_radicalism_taspinar.pdf; Jones,  A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other 
Salafi Jihadists; Yonah Alexander, “Maghreb & Sahel: Addressing the Rising Threat from al-Qaeda & 
other Terrorists in North & West/Central Africa.” International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, (January 2010): 1-80, 
http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/525_Maghreb%20Terrorism%20report.pdf; Eli Berman, 
Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009. 
10 “Terrorists Exploiting Gaps in State Capacity to Implement Counter-Terrorism Measures, Security 
Council Told in Briefings by Sanctions Committee Chairs,” United Nations, May 10, 2012.  
http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10642.doc.htm; Cullen S. Hendrix and Joseph K. Young, State 
Capacity and Terrorism: A Two- Dimensional Approach, Security Studies, 23:2, 329-363, doi: 
10.1080/09636412.2014.905358.  
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strategies. In 2004, then-U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Cofer Black, 
noted that “the struggle against terrorism is also in part the struggle for a better society” 
and that “anti-corruption efforts are as essential to the struggle against terrorism as the 
struggle against poverty.”11 This sentiment is found in a number of papers and books 
written since then, which suggests that weak states, poor institutions, and ineffective 
governments prevent counterterrorism policies’ effective implementation.12 In a more 
cynical line of reasoning, others suggest that state governments have little incentive to 
stop terrorism because they benefit from counterterrorism aid more than they would 
benefit from the eradication of terrorism.13 Furthermore, some suggest that U.S. 
counterterrorism funding negatively affects weak states’ ability to counter terrorism 
because it compels states to comply with Western policies.14 This compliance can lead to 
the state being perceived as illegitimate—a main tenet of Islamic radicals. Indeed, some 
suggest that Muslims in the region harbor an increasingly strong resentment toward their 
states, which results from the states perceived compliance with Western allies seen as 
anti-Muslim.15 In the end, the policy prescriptions in this literature are similar to those in 
the militarization debate—counterterrorism strategies need stable and secure African 
states to succeed.  
                                                 
11 Cofer Black, Amb., “The Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa” (Remarks at the 
Second Intergovernmental High-Level Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism In Africa in 
Algiers, Algeria, October 20, 2004). http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2004/37230.htm.  
12 Lilanna Kenendy-Boudali, Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across 
Africa’s Sahel Region. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT335.pdf; Subhayu 
Bandyopadhyay, Todd Sandler, and Javed Younas, “Foreign Aid as Counterterrorism Policy.” Oxford 
Economic Papers 63, no.3 (2011): 423-447. doi: 10.1093/oep/gpq030. 
13 Andrew Boutton, “U.S. Foreign Aid, Interstate Rivalry, and Incentives for Counterterrorism 
Cooperation.“ Journal of Peace Research 51, no.6 (September 2014): 742–52. doi: 
10.1177/0022343314543144.; Jeremy Keenan, The Dying Sahara: U.S. Imperialism and Terror in Africa 
(New York: Palgrave, 2013). 
14 Beth Elise Whitaker, “Compliance Among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism 
Regime.” Review of International Studies 36, no.3 (July 2010): 660–62. doi:10.1017/S0260210510000641. 
15 David Dickson, “Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and 
Diplomatic Agenda,” United States Institute of Peace 140, (May 2005): 7-9, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr140.pdf; James J.F. Forest, “Al-Qaeda’s Influence in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Myths, Realities and Possibilities,” Perspectives on Terrorism 5, no. 3–4 (September 2011): 72, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/156/309. 
 7 
The state’s capacity, when compared against the level of religiously motivated 
terrorist threats, provides a summary of the problem in the Sahel and Maghreb. In short, 
state capacity is limited and the terrorist threat is high. Considering the weak state 
capacity, the question of if bilateral U.S. counterterrorism funds can be applied 
effectively is a distinct theme throughout the writing.16 While it does not specifically 
address Salafi-Jihadism, there is literature that provides a regional context to explain why 
Islamic fundamentalist groups like AQIM, Boko Haram, Ansaru, and MUJAO continue 
to operate freely throughout the region. The regional issues are a result of the weak 
governments and developmental problems discussed previously. While each group has 
specific objectives and employs a wide and divergent range of tactics, there is general 
agreement throughout the literature that terrorism and violent extremism groups co-opt 
regional causes and exploit the limitations of weak states. Therefore, there is a wide body 
of literature that treats terrorism—in this case Salafi-Jihadism—as a regional problem, 
requiring regional solutions.17 This draws the conclusion that, while bi-lateral agreements 
are useful at times, the issues are transnational in nature and the United States should 
treat them as such. The global strategy of the Salafi Jihad movement stresses that regional 
and international collaboration is critical.18 
B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Critiques of counterterrorism efforts all stem from the general view that 
counterterrorism efforts in the Trans-Sahara region have not effectively countered violent 
extremist ideologies in the region. Since the criticism diverges from there and divides 
                                                 
16 Counterterrorism and the Role of Special Operations Forces: Testimony presented before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade (2014) 
(statement of Seth G. Jones, RAND Office of External Affairs). 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA18/20140408/102109/HHRG-113-FA18-Wstate-JonesS-
20140408.pdf.  
17 Matthew Schwartz, Liat Shetret, and Alistair Millar, “Rethinking International Counterterrorism 
Assistance to the Greater Horn of Africa: Toward a Regional Risk Reduction Strategy.” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 7, no. 6 (December 2013): 100-112. http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/314-
2107-2-PB.pdf; Lilianne Kennedy-Boudali, Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy 
Across Africa’s Sahel Region. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT335.pdf; Richard H. Schultz, 
“Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement.” INSS Occasional Paper 6, United States Air 
Force Academy, 2008. 
18 Jones, “A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists,” 1-12. 
 8 
into three distinct schools of thought, explanations for the lack of effectiveness lie in the 
design, scope, or intent of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. As such, there are three 
potential answers to address why U.S. counterterrorism spending has failed to stem the 
tide of Salafi-Jihadism in the Trans-Sahara region. First, there are many who suggest that 
despite the “whole of government” design of U.S. Counterterrorism strategy in Northwest 
Africa, the budget is largely centered on the Department of Defense and, therefore, fails 
to allocate sufficient resources for socioeconomic factors like de-radicalization programs 
and religious education and tolerance programs. Therefore, one possible answer is that 
U.S. counterterrorism funding needs to be expanded to include the aforementioned 
programs and the execution of counterterrorism initiatives needs to incorporate USAID, 
the Department of State, and other U.S. government agencies that are designed to 
exercise “soft power.” This would involve an adjustment of funding to include multi-year 
funding measures so that long-term sustainable development goals are designed and met.  
Second, there is the notion that the capacity and stability of these states is not 
developed enough to receive and benefit from the counterterrorism assistance that the 
U.S. offers. Therefore, the scope of U.S. counterterrorism efforts is too narrow and needs 
to widen to first address the issues of good governance, corruption, and state legitimacy 
to create a sustainable impact. Considering that the countries of West Africa consistently 
rank as some of the most corrupt states in the world, it is clear that this issue remains 
unresolved.19 The U.S. government explicitly recognizes the link between politically 
unstable states or ungoverned spaces and the potential rise of terrorism or violent 
extremism.20 In this case, the possible answer is that U.S. counterterrorism strategy and 
funding needs to be expanded to incorporate programs that specifically address 
corruption and governance. Furthermore, U.S. government programs would need to be 
predicated upon the quality of the partner country’s governance.  
                                                 
19 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2013,” Transparency International, August 23, 2015, 
http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/cpi2013_brochure_single_pages?e=2496456/5813913.  
20 Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism, Joint Publication 3–26, Washington, DC: JP3 -
26, 2014, Chapter 1, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_26.pdf.  
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 Lastly, there is the idea that more effort should be put into developing regional 
organizations if U.S. counterterrorism efforts are going to address the transnational nature 
of the Salafi-Jihadist groups that operate in the region. In addition, the regional approach 
alleviates many of the issues of weak state capacity and corruption addressed in the 
second hypothesis by directing funds to regional organizations rather than individual 
states. This shift requires that the design, intent, and scope of the United States’ 
counterterrorism efforts be overhauled to interact more directly with regional and sub-
regional actors to develop counterterrorism strategies that appropriately address regional 
concerns. Furthermore, it would require that the United States alter its funding measures 
to allocate for the shift to funding regional organizations vice funding individual state 
actors.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis tries to offer an understanding of why U.S. counterterrorism efforts 
have failed to counter the Salafi-Jihadist organizations in the Trans-Sahara region of 
Northwest Africa. To evaluate U.S. counterterrorism spending and the rise of these 
organizations, I examine three case studies—Mauritania, Mali, and Nigeria—to 
determine why the counterterrorism funds that the United States has spent over the past 
decade have failed to stem the rise of Salafi-Jihadism in the Sahel. Comparing these three 
countries provides an interesting case study of U.S. counterterrorism spending and the 
outcomes. While each country has the common problem of Salafi-Jihadists with which to 
contend, they each present a unique example as well. Mauritania, a long-standing 
recipient of U.S. counterterrorism funds, has achieved moderate success in dealing with 
AQIM (and like-minded organizations). However, while they have significantly 
weakened the organization, they have failed to eradicate it and its ideology continues to 
motivate followers. Mali, long the example of successful reform in the region, was 
rapidly inundated with a Salafi-Jihadist rebellion after a coup toppled the elected 
government. It was only after Western intervention that the rebellion was put down. 
Meanwhile, Nigeria struggles with a particularly virulent re-incarnation of Boko Haram 
that re-emerged in 2009 when the group reorganized following the death of its leader at 
the hands of Nigerian officials.  
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I utilize government budgetary reports from the GAO, Congressional testimonies 
that outline the counterterrorism strategy in the Trans-Sahara region, and assessments 
from international organizations and domestic agencies to evaluate counterterrorism and 
consider if the spending is being properly allocated to support the counterterrorism 
strategy. In addition, the paper utilizes data from the World Bank, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, and elsewhere to examine the capabilities and 
capacity of the recipient countries after the steady increase of U.S. counterterrorism 
spending in the Trans-Sahara region since 9/11. Data from the National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC) and elsewhere is utilized to examine the rise of violent extremism in the 
region. This data is applied to the theoretical and empirical works discussed in the 
literature review that proposes that regional solutions and developmental solutions hold 
the key to successful counterterrorism strategies.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis examines the efficacy of the United States’ counterterrorism strategy 
in the Trans-Sahara region and assess why Salafi-Jihadist organizations continue to 
thrive. The thesis is broken into five chapters. The second chapter outlines the origins, 
ideologies, and agendas of Salafi-Jihadist organizations including AQIM, Ansaru, Boko 
Haram, and MUJAO, with particular attention paid to the post-9/11 timeframe. The 
limited scope is necessary to assess why the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel is 
not affecting these particular organizations. The third chapter discusses why the current 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts have not addressed the root causes of Salafi-Jihadism. The 
fourth chapter evaluates the particular cases of Nigeria, Mali, and Mauritania where 
Salafi-Jihadism has had varying degrees of success over the past decade. The fifth 
chapter analyzes if U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region have failed to halt the 
advance of Salafi-Jihadist organizations like Boko Haram, AQIM, and MUJAO. In 
addition, policy recommendations are made that may enhance future counterterrorism 
strategy in the region. The sixth and final chapter concludes with review of the major 
observations noted in the paper. 
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The major finding in this paper is that current counterterrorism policies in the 
Sahel lack the proper scope and design to effectively counter the unique agenda of the 
Salafi-Jihadist ideology. The limited and corrupt capacity of these states coupled with the 
military centered approach of counterterrorism operations does not properly counter the 
narrative of Salafi-Jihadism which views western ideals of the secular states and 
democracy as illegitimate and Sharia law as the only acceptable alternative. Therefore, 
unlike other extremist organizations and insurgencies throughout the world, Salafi-
Jihadist organizations do not intend to enter into negotiations with the governments and 
will likely not be appeased by offers of autonomy. Despite this hard stance, there is 
reason to believe that a significant number of fighters and supporters are motivated 
primarily by opportunity rather than ideology. As such, state capacity takes in an 
increasingly important role in the U.S. counterterrorism strategy throughout the region. 
Certainly Department of Defense activities will play a crucial role in the eradication of 
these organizations, but the growth of state capacity remains a critical shortfall in the 
region preventing long-term suppression of Salafi-Jihadist organizations like Boko 
Haram, AQIM, and MUJAO.  
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II. STRATEGIC OVERVIEW OF THE TRANS-SAHARA 
REGION 
Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic needs 
and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, 
the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American 
people. To advance our common security, we must address the underlying 
political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization 
and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to 
manage threats within their borders and to be our partners in addressing 
common challenges. 
—2010 National Security Strategy 
This chapter provides an overview of the strategic situation in the Trans-Sahara 
region. Beginning with an overview of the United States’ counterterrorism strategies in 
the region from the post-9/11 environment up to the 2015, the chapter surveys the 
evolution of counterterrorism initiatives from the Pan-Sahel Initiative though the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and the creation of United States Africa Command. 
Afterward, there is an overview of Salafi-Jihadism including the ideological history, 
agenda, and status of organizations. Lastly, there is a measurement of state capacity 
throughout the Trans-Saharan region. These three pillars establish the geopolitical 
environment that frames counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. 
A. UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN THE TRANS-
SAHARA  
In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, U.S. national security 
priorities were re-aligned to support the Global War on Terror with counterterrorism as 
the centerpiece. This realignment led to an unprecedented interest in Africa—specifically 
the Trans-Sahara region of Northwest Africa—because of the belief that terrorists would 
exploit the large ungoverned spaces, disenfranchised populations, and insular 
governments to establish training camps and recruitment centers. The notion that the 
Trans-Sahara region comprised of the Maghreb and the Sahel was a hotbed for terrorist 
activity was not always a readily accepted assertion. Similarly, while the Maghreb’s 
security implications for the United States were well established, the idea that Sahelian 
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countries represented a national security threat to the United States was contentious.21 An 
International Crisis Group report from 2005 entitled Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: 
Fact or Fiction? is representative of the period with the report suggesting that any 
declaration of the Sahel as the new front in the global war on terror was overstating the 
problem of terrorism in the region.22 Despite these misgivings, in a prescient warning the 
report cautioned that “a misconceived and heavy handed approach could tip the scale the 
wrong way” and that “an effective counter-terrorism policy [in the Sahel] needs to 
address the threat in the broadest terms, with more development than military aid and 
greater United States-European collaboration.”23 Reports like these seemingly influenced 
the early development and design of the counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel.  
“The Sahel, a word derived from the Arabic word ‘sahil’ meaning shore, is a 
semi-arid belt of barren, sandy and rock-strewn land which stretches 3,860km across the 
breadth of the African continent (see Figure 1).”24 As a geographic region, it marks the 
transitional physical land between the Saharan desert to the north and the 
characteristically fertile lands to the south. Stretching from northern Senegal in the West 
to the Red Sea in the East, the region comprises southern Mauritania, central Mali, the 
extreme northeast of Nigeria, and large portions of Niger, Chad, and Sudan before 
tapering off into Ethiopia.25 Geopolitically, it represents a cultural divide between the 
north and the south and is home to an estimated 100 million people, with that number 
expected to double in the coming decades.26  
                                                 
21 David Gutelius, “U.S. Creates African Enemies Where None Were Before,” Christian Science 
Monitor, July 11, 2003. http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0711/p11s01-coop.html. 
22 International Crisis Group, “Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?,” Africa Report 92 
(March 2005): 19. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-
africa/Islamist%20Terrorism%20in%20the%20Sahel%20Fact%20or%20Fiction.pdf.  
23 Ibid.,1.  
24 “Sahel: Backgrounder of the Sahel, West Africa’s Poorest Region,” Integrated Regional Information 
Networks, June 2, 2008. http://www.irinnews.org/report/78514/sahel-backgrounder-on-the-sahel-west-
africa-s-poorest-region.  
25 Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “Sahel.”  
26 “Sahel: Backgrounder of the Sahel, West Africa’s Poorest Region.”  
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Figure 1.  Map of Sahel27 
Underpinning the geographic and geopolitical realities in the Sahel is a catena of 
developmental issues—resource scarcity, poor governance, poverty, disease, and 
inhospitable climates—that produce chronic insecurity.28 While there is no consensus 
among scholars on the question of what causes terrorism, most theories claim that 
economic inequality, structural injustice, and weak governments are contributing factors. 
Denying certain segments of society access to resources—economic, social, or political—
means they are more likely to support, directly or indirectly, violent ideologies because 
they frequently promise access to those resources—even though, oftentimes, these 
promises are little more than recruitment tactics. This logic is interwoven throughout U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts in Africa. As it became apparent to U.S. foreign policy makers 
that Africa was more than just a humanitarian concern, it also became apparent that any 
counterterrorism strategy would need to address the underlying causes of terrorism as 
                                                 
27 “Sahel Region,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, August 22, 2015,  
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_19_Sahel.pdf.  
28 “Sahel: A Call of Humanitarian Aid,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, February 20, 2015, 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/ROWCA/Coordination/SRP/Sahel_SRP_2015.pdf.  
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well as defend against its effects. It was from within this geopolitical environment that 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts launched in the Sahel.  
1. Evolution of Counterterrorism Policy in the Trans-Sahara 
In November 2002, the Department of State introduced the Pan-Sahel Initiative—
a program designed to combat terrorism, increase border security, and promote regional 
cooperation in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.29 The Pan-Sahel Initiative superseded 
the piecemeal efforts that defined the United States’ counterterrorism policy in Africa 
from the end of the Cold War until September 11, 2001.30 While the design, scope, and 
intent of the program drew significant criticism, it quickly expanded as combat 
operations in Afghanistan began to inform policy makers and decisions regarding Islamic 
radicalism took on a sense of urgency.31 In 2005, the Department of State substituted the 
Pan-Sahel Initiative with the more comprehensively scoped Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), expanding geographically to include Algeria, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia (later adding Burkina Faso in 2009 and 
Cameroon in 2013).32 Additionally, the design and intent of TSCTP expanded beyond 
that of PSI—that focused primarily on military-to-military assistance—to include 
developmental assistance and diplomatic efforts.33 As a collaborative effort between the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the United States Agency for 
International Development, TSCTP is a whole of government approach to countering 
terrorism and violent extremism. As an interagency effort, TSCTP endeavored “to 
enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the pan-Sahel, to confront the 
challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the Trans-Sahara, and to facilitate 
                                                 
29 “Pan-Sahel Initiative,” United States Department of State, June 9, 2014, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/14987.htm. 
30 International Crisis Group. Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?, 27.  
31 Stephen Ellis, “Briefing: The Pan-Sahel Initiative,” African Affairs 103, no. 412 (July 2004): 459–
464. doi:10.1093/afraf/adh067. 
32 TSCTP was initially designated as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI).  
33 Lesley Anne Warner, “America’s Fight Against Terror in West Africa—and its Shortcomings,” The 
National Interest, April 3, 2014.  http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/catch-22-the-sahel-10176.  
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cooperation between those countries and U.S. partners in the Maghreb.”34 It was not too 
long before the scope of counterterrorism efforts expanded even further with the creation 
of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) as the newest geographic combatant 
command.  
AFRICOM, an offshoot of United States European Command (EUCOM), 
officially stood up in October 2008 after years of development. From inception, the 
command had an interagency design that reflected the dynamic environment of its 
geographic area of responsibility. According to the published mission statement, 
AFRICOM “in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense 
capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to 
advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and 
prosperity.”35 The civilian-military design allows the United States to leverage the full 
spectrum of government efforts—diplomacy, development, and defense—against a 
narrowly focused counterterrorism agenda. Furthermore, the interagency approach 
attempts to avoid the pitfalls often associated with the security-development nexus where 
security concerns subordinate developmental initiatives. With the creation of AFRICOM 
there was a dramatic increase in military personnel permanently assigned to support 
operations and embassies throughout Africa, which currently numbers over 2000 
personnel.36 Alongside these manpower increases, responsibility for TSCTP activities 
transferred to AFRICOM, as it became the central mechanism for the execution of the 
United States’ counterterrorism strategy in the region.37 These increases in military 
presence on the continent have persistently raised concerns that the Department of 
Defense will overshadow the Department of State’s diplomatic efforts on the continent.38 
                                                 
34 “Country Reports: Africa Overview,” United States Department of State, June 11, 2014, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209979.htm. 
35 “What We Do,” United States Africa Command, June 01, 2015, http://www.africom.mil/what-we-
do.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Stephen Emerson, “Back to the Future: The Evolution of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy in Africa,” 
Insight on Africa 6, no.1 (January 2014): 43–56. doi: 10.1177/0975087814532587. 
38 United States Department of State, Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign, 
Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 2006, http://fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/embassies.pdf.  
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These concerns are valid, as any such imbalance would limit the breadth of 
counterterrorism efforts in the region thereby weakening the ability to counter violent 
extremism.  
The need for a wide breadth for counterterrorism efforts is acknowledged 
throughout the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The strategy details the 
variety of bilateral and multilateral programs in which the United States engages to build 
short and long-term partner capacity in the military, law enforcement, government, and 
civil society sectors. These programs support diplomatic efforts by addressing the 
underlying conditions that terrorism exploits, preventing terrorist activity, and enhancing 
partner nation stability.39 Within the TSCTP, the Department of Defense conducts 
military assistance and security sector training under the designation Operation Enduring 
Freedom-Trans Sahara.40 Enhancing military capacity occurs primarily through Title 22 
military-to-military training and Title 10 familiarization programs like the International 
Military Education and Training program, which affords foreign officers the ability to 
train at U.S. service schools. Funding for these programs in TSCTP countries was 
approximately $7.5 million from 2009 through 2013 and will likely be the same in 2014 
and 2015.41 In addition to training opportunities, there are equipment sales conducted 
under the Global Train and Equip “1206” program that authorizes the Department of 
Defense to deliver equipment, supplies, or training to foreign countries in order to build 
their capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations. Initially allocated $200 million in 
2006, later authorizations increased it to $350 million, of which TSCTP accounted for 
approximately 14% from 2006 until 2011.42 Lastly, the military conducts regional 
exercises like FLINTLOCK and bi-lateral exercises like AFRICAN LION that focus on 
                                                 
39 “USAID/West Africa Peace Through Development (PDEV): Program Assessment Report,” United 
States Agency for International Development, March 2011, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACR829.pdf; 
“Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program Overview,” United States Africa Command, June 01, 
2015, www.africom.mil/Doc/7432.  
40 OEF-TS transitioned to Operation Juniper Shield in 2012, but OEF-TS remains common.  
41 “International Military Education and Training Account Summary,” U.S. Department of State 
website. May 20, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm.  
42 Nina M. Serafino, Security Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for 
Congress (CRS Report No. RS22855) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 4, 
http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf. 
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building counterterrorism skills and interoperability in an operational environment.43 
When combined these initiatives in training and familiarization, equipment sales, and 
operational exercises illustrate the scope of the United States military’s hard-power 
initiatives to counter terrorism in the Trans-Sahara region.  
In addition to the traditional hard-power aspects of military training, there have 
been soft-power initiatives that the Department of Defense has undertaken. One such 
soft-power initiative that spanned agency and international partners is Operation 
Objective Voice.44 A proactive effort to counter violent extremist organizations by 
attacking their very core—the ideology—Operation Objective Voice has been employed 
throughout the Sahel region since 2007. Through broadcast messages, Internet websites, 
social media, and Military Information Support Teams and public diplomacy officials, 
the operation attempts to counter extremist propaganda.45 Primarily operating through 
local partners, the operation provides messages that promote tolerance, peace, and 
understanding in Mali and Nigeria in an attempt to leverage the elements of soft power to 
counter violent extremist ideologies.46 On the one hand, programs like this demonstrate 
how seamlessly disparate efforts can blend; on the other hand they show the increasing 
presence of the military in a realm traditionally inhabited by diplomacy. Regardless of the 
assessment, the program’s existence shows that the whole of government approach to 
countering terrorism in more than just rhetoric.  
While Department of Defense initiatives dominate the TSCTP, USAID does 
operate a number of development programs in the region. One of the most notable, the 
Peace through Development initiative has undertaken numerous initiatives that address 
socioeconomic, political and cultural issues in Chad, Mali and Niger as a way to mitigate 
                                                 
43 “What We Do,” United States Africa Command, June 01, 2015, http://www.africom.mil/what-we-
do.  
44 “Operation Objective Voice,” Global Security, May 18, 2015, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/objective-voice.htm.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy 80, (Autumn 1990): 153–171. 
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/PPA-730-27/Nye%201990.pdf.  
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the underlying causes of terrorism.47 Currently, USAID has 687 active projects in Sub-
Saharan Africa with 107 in the Sahelian countries of Senegal—41; Mali—61; and 
Nigeria—5; accounting for 15.58% of ongoing Sub-Saharan African projects.48 These 
projects include specific topics like Agriculture and Food Security; Democracy, 
Governance, and Human Rights; and Working on Conflict and Crises, in addition to other 
initiatives centered on improving education, health, and the economy.49 The volume and 
breadth of these initiatives are illustrative of the holistic ideology that underpins 
counterterrorism efforts in the Trans-Sahara, but it is equally illustrative of the lopsided 
nature of policy application. A chronological rendering of USAID projects further 
illustrates the continued evolution of policies designed to countering the underlying 
causes of terrorism. Looking at the decade from 1992 to 2002 there were two USAID 
projects in the Trans-Sahara region, both in Mali; the following seven years saw that 
number rise to 11 and incorporate Senegal and Nigeria.50 After the formation of 
AFRICOM, the total number of projects rose to 94—nearly a nine-fold increase—but 
failed to expand into the remaining countries of the Trans-Sahara.51 The disproportionate 
commitment to Senegal and Mali is likely more indicative of individual state capacity 
than any bias, but despite the motivation, it prompts questions about the regional nature 
of USAIDs support to the TSCTP.52 In addition to these geographic limitations, there is a 
dearth of programs explicitly designed to counter violent extremist ideologies. President 
Obama acknowledged as much at a Countering Violent Extremism Summit in February 
2015, discussing the need to focus more on prevention and to address the “ideologies, the 
infrastructure of extremists—the propagandists, the recruiters, the funders who radicalize 
                                                 
47 PDEV was executed from 2008–2011; PDEV II began in 2011 and is scheduled to end in 2016.  
48 “Where We Work: Interactive Map,” United States Agency for International Development, 
accessed May 22, 2015. http://map.usaid.gov/?l=regional&w=SUB%20SAHARAN%20AFRICA.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Key engagement criteria outlined in the 2011 USAID Development Response to Violent Extremism 
and Insurgency Policy specifically address host nation commitment and security of agency personnel as 
determining criteria.  
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and recruit or incite people to violence.”53 Thus, while USAID programs are 
characteristic of a holistic ideology of countering terrorism they are limited in scope and 
execution.  
As the lead agency, the Department of State executes programs designed to 
promote “public diplomacy efforts, provide embassy security and support for TSCTP 
activities, and support some counterterrorism training for law enforcement officers.”54 In 
addition to operating under the broad umbrella of the TSCTP, the Department of State 
has a number of other notable programs and initiatives that complement the 
counterterrorism efforts of the TSCTP. Within the Department of State, the Public 
Diplomacy Office is the de facto lead on countering violent extremist ideologies by 
building up the resilience of at-risk communities.55 In addition, the Department of State 
uses the Anti-Terrorism Assistance and the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, 
and Related programs to fund training and buy equipment to bolster law enforcement 
capacity in investigations, border and critical infrastructure security, regional 
coordination, and management.56 The International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement program strengthens the “partner nation’s judicial and legislative capacity to 
prosecute and” imprison terrorists.57 Restricting travel and access to resources is a joint 
effort between the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the Department of 
Homeland Security and is evident in the Terrorist Screening and Interdiction programs 
conducted throughout the region.58 Meanwhile, the Counterterrorism Finance program 
                                                 
53 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent 
Extremism” (speech, South Court Auditourium, Whitehouse, February 18, 2015).  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/remarks-president-closing-summit-countering-
violent-extremism.  
54 Johnson, Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership, 14.  
55 Jeffrey Swedberg and Steve Smith, “Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Evaluative Study.” 
Dexis Consulting Group (April 2014): 4.  
56 Curt Tarnoff and Alex Tiersky, State, Foreign Operations Appropriations: A Guide to Component 
Accounts (CRS Report No. R40482) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 11-12, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40482.pdf. 
57 “FY 2012 Program and Budget Guide: Program Overview,” United States Department of State, 
May 21, 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rpt/pbg/fy2012/185676.htm. 
58 “Terrorist Screening and Interdiction Programs,” United States Department of State, May 20, 2015, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/tip/. 
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builds legal frameworks and regulatory regimes, and establishes Financial Intelligence 
Units that strengthen the investigative skills of law enforcement entities and builds 
prosecutorial and judicial abilities.59 This suite of programs again demonstrates the 
comprehensive scope of tools the United States employs against terrorism in the Trans-
Saharan region. Despite the comprehensive nature of these counterterrorism programs 
they only show the strategic intent, to understand the level of operational execution a 
budget analysis is necessary.  
2. Evolution of Counterterrorism Budget in the Trans-Sahara 
The budget for counterterrorism initiatives in the Trans-Sahara has grown 
considerably from the creation of the Pan-Sahel Initiative to today (see Figure 2). At its 
inception, Congress approved $6.25 million in 2004, with specific country allocations for 
“Mali—$3.5 million; Niger—$1.7 million; Mauritania—$500,000; and Chad—
$500,000.”60 As the Pan-Sahel Initiative expanded into the TSCTP, the budget expanded 
significantly and from 2005 through 2008, the United States obligated $353 million, with 
approximately 74% of the funds still going to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.61 The 
emphasis on spending in the Sahelian countries is the result of U.S. counterterrorism 
policies, as well as the partner countries willingness and capability to absorb TSCTP 
activities. Despite being the premier counterterrorism policy tool in the region, from 2009 
through 2013 the TSCTP budget shrank—primarily a reaction to the financial crisis—
with the United States obligating $288 million; and while Mali, Mauritania, and Niger 
still received a bulk of the funds—approximately 38%—it was significantly less than the 
74% received from 2004–08.62 The proposed 2014 budget continued this trend, 
                                                 
59 “Programs and Initiatives,” United States Department of State, May 23, 2015, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#CTF. 
60 Johnson, Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership, 14. 
61 Ibid., 2.  
62 Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, June 2014 (GAO-08-
860) (Washington, DC: Governmnet Accountability Office), 21; Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., U.S. Efforts 
in Northwest Africa Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management (GAO-14-518) 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2014), 15, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664337.pdf.  
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requesting $45 million for TSCTP activities.63 The increased balance of funds distributed 
among countries in the Sahel, Sahara, and Maghreb illustrates an increased willingness 
and capability of partner countries to process TSCTP activities and the widening scope of 
the United States’ counterterrorism strategy in the region. These funds also illustrate the 
long-term dedication to the region as a strategic priority with almost $750 million applied 
throughout the region.  
 
Figure 2.  Money Spent (in U.S.$ Millions) from Implementation of Pan-Sahel 
Initiative through the End of FY13. Burkina Faso was added to the 
TSTCP in 2009. Funds for Mali were suspended after the 2012 coup.  
When these budgets are dissected along agency lines, it becomes apparent that 
Department of Defense funds are disproportionate in relation to USAID and Department 
of State funds, with the Department of Defense spending $256 million of the $353 
million obligated from 2005–2008 and USAID and the Department of State spending $96 
million during the same period. In other words, the Department of Defense spent three 
                                                 
63 United States Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2: Foreign 
Operations. Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 2014, 359, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208290.pdf. 
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times the amount than that of the other agencies combined.64 The budget breakdown 
from 2009 to 2013 shows increased parity across agencies, with the Department of State 
and USAID disbursing about $139 million, or 48 %, of the TSCTP funds.65 This change 
corresponds to the introduction of AFRICOM, likely the result of increased fund 
management and interoperability of priorities across the agencies. Considering that 
economic growth, health, education, and good governance are the responsibility of 
USAID and the Department of State, correcting this imbalance toward military spending 
was critical for the success of the program. No matter how much money is spent training 
and equipping partner militaries in counterterrorism tactics, if these same societies are 
developmentally unstable terrorist recruitment and violent extremism will find an 
audience. Additionally, this data undercuts skeptics who contend that counterterrorism 
efforts are tantamount to the “securitization of aid,” an argument that ignores that these 
programs are part of a broader effort to combat the underlying causes of terrorism and 
violent extremist ideologies.  
Typically, criticism levied against United States’ counterterrorism efforts arises 
from a concentration on the Department of Defense budget vis-à-vis the budgets of the 
Department of State, USAID, and other agencies. Revealingly, the Department of State’s 
proposed 2016 budget, which also includes USAID funding, requests a significant 
increase in security and development activities in the Maghreb and Sahel countries to 
“address challenges to U.S. national security emanating” from the region.66 Although the 
Congressional Budget Justification does not include country specific totals, it does show 
a significant increase in security and justice aid to countries in the Maghreb and Sahel 
from 2014 to 2016.
67 The proposed budget, together with the trend toward parity across 
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agencies, suggests that counterterrorism policies in the region are finally realizing their 
whole of government agenda.  
3. Analysis of Counterterrorism Policy in the Trans-Sahara 
As a multi-agency effort that spans across the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, and USAID, in addition to numerous other agencies TSCTP is 
exceptional in the U.S. foreign policy landscape. As such, the development and execution 
has not been without serious issues that stem from this unique interagency effort—the 
most notable being the lack of a common strategy.68 The creation of AFRICOM—itself a 
hybrid of diplomacy, development, and defense—saw execution authority for TSCTP 
activities transition from EUCOM, and implementation of counterterrorism programs 
increased as a result of the additional personnel. Despite AFRICOMs coordination, a 
2010 review of TSCTP activities revealed that a true interagency concept had not yet 
emerged and that a coordinated approach to counterterrorism in the Trans-Sahara was not 
evident.69 Furthermore, TSCTP operations have been subject to fluctuations in the 
disbursement of funds and uneven implementation of programs across the region, 
resulting in some nations getting more than others.70 Although data shows countries such 
as Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger get more funding than Senegal and Nigeria, these 
differences are likely the result of a country’s capacity or willingness to absorb training 
and assistance.71 Likewise, the disparity in programs that exists between the Department 
of State, the Department of Defense, and USAID has as much to do with work force and 
capacity to execute programs as it does with budgetary variations across the agencies. For 
example, the Department of Defense has a permanent presence in every embassy with the 
Defense Attaché and Office of Security Cooperation compared to USAID, which runs 
projects out of regional offices. Recently, funding reflects that these disparities are fading 
                                                 
68 Warner, The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, 31. 
69 Martin F. Kindl, AFRICOM’S Role in Interagency Counterterrorism Efforts: An Assessment in 3D. 
(Homeland Security Digital Library 698166). Washington, D.C: Homeland Security Digital Library, 2010. 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=698166.   
70 Johnson, Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership, 11. 
71 Ibid., 2. 
 26 
and the commitment to countering terrorism in the Trans-Sahara via an interagency 
design remains strong.  
In addition to disparities in funding and execution, the TSCTP has struggled to 
effectively implement programs across agencies and track funds.72 As Todd Moss writes, 
“the inability of the interagency to clarify objectives, deploy tools, and monitor how 
things are progressing is hard enough for a single sector in a single country; it’s nearly 
impossible for a regional multi-sectorial effort like TSCTP/OEF-TS.”73 Criticisms of this 
kind, that address the lack of an overarching strategy, explain the uneven application of 
TSCTP resources that favor Department of Defense activities and the imbalance of fund 
distribution throughout the partner countries. To remedy these problems, Congress 
established the Global Security Contingency Fund to address the numerous defects that 
undermine interagency efforts abroad.74 The Global Security Contingency Fund allotted 
$300 million toward security and counterterrorism operations—with approximately 80% 
allotted for the Department of Defense and 20% for the Department of State.75 A few 
years later (and after the coup in Mali), the United States administration proposed an 
additional $5 billion—$1 billion for the Department of State and $4 billion for the 
Department of Defense—to be added to the Overseas Contingency Operations fund to 
establish a new, more flexible Counterterrorism Partnership Fund that would augment the 
existing authorities to establish a more effective counterterrorism approach, by 
developing the counterterrorism capacity of partners, mainly through “train-and-equip” 
activities.76 These supplementary sources of counterterrorism funding suggest that the 
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scope of operations in the region will continue, matching the growth of Islamic 
extremism in the region.  
Lastly, despite greatly expanding in design and scope, counterterrorism efforts 
have evolved over the years in a vacuum with little direct interaction with regional 
organizations such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or 
international organizations like the United Nations. A notable departure from this has 
been the cooperation between the United States and France—a long-standing actor in the 
region due to their colonial legacy.77 Department of State officials understand that, while 
TSCTPs interagency approach to countering terrorism is crucial, there is a need to 
strengthen the TSCTP—through alignment with regionally involved organizations—and 
expand beyond the narrowly focused counterterrorism program because the current 
design will not remain sufficient to counter the various, and constantly evolving threats 
that plague the region.78 Likewise, recent testimony before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs illustrates that Department of Defense leadership also understands the 
need to integrate counterterrorism activities into the larger security framework and 
coordinate more effectively with the international community.79 Considering the intent of 
counterterrorism policy is to strengthen the region as a whole, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that increased alignment with regional organizations and actors will only serve to 
bolster the United States’ efforts.  
Overall, United States counterterrorism policy in the Trans-Sahara region has 
evolved considerably since 2002. Despite some early funding issues and programmatic 
limitations, the counterterrorism initiatives have grown in design, scope, and intent while 
remaining focused on the primary objective of countering terrorism and violent extremist 
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ideologies vis-à-vis a whole of government approach. While success in these 
circumstances is hard to define, commitment is not. Available data suggests that the 
United States is undoubtedly committed to countering terrorism in the region by 
increasing the capacity of the partner nations. Furthermore, the conceptual framework of 
United States counterterrorism efforts in the Trans-Sahara account for the permissible 
environment of the Sahel and the Maghreb by acknowledging the development-defense-
diplomacy nexus. Despite all of this, terrorism and the spread of violent extremist 
ideologies have been steadily on the rise in the Sahel and the Maghreb since 2002, calling 
into question the efficacy of the United States’ policy.  
B. SALAFI-JIHADISM IN THE TRANS-SAHARA  
Islam is unique in the religious landscape due, in large part, to the absence of 
secularism associated with the majority of other religions.80 Salafi-Jihadist groups take 
this anti-secularism one step further, contending that the secular state causes corruption 
and inequality, which can only be solved through the implementation of Sharia law.81 To 
understand exactly what the neologism Salafi-Jihadism means, it is crucial to understand 
the terminology. The Salafi strain of Islam has some specific ideological aspects that 
separate it from other traditions within Sunni Islam. While all Salafists seek the 
establishment of a theocratic state based on Islamic law, there are notable differences in 
their tactics. These distinctions break Salafists into three distinctive yet overlapping 
categories: scripturalists, whose tactical approach relies on spiritual outreach, charity, and 
education; political-Salafists, who promote their goals through participation in the 
political system; and the Salafi-Jihadists, who wage a violent fight to promote their 
goals.82 This last group presents a particular concern to the Sahel because they have no 
intention of participating in the political process, and their fight taxes the fragile 
institutions of the state. The term jihad, perhaps one of the more misunderstood terms of 
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our times, literally translates to English as “struggle,” and refers to several different 
aspects of Muslim though that ranges from the physical to the spiritual.83 Together these 
terms—Salafi and Jihad—combine to describe the specific faction within the Salafi 
community that, over the past fifteen years, has dominated much of the international 
conversation about terrorism. Although they are united to the larger Salafi community 
through common religious beliefs, they are separated from other factions within the 
community by their strict contextual reading of the Quran.84 More than just academic, 
these differences can considerably affect the efficacy of the counter measures employed 
by the United States in the Sahel.  
1. Ideological Beginnings of Salafi-Jihadism 
In any revolutionary idea there are ideological, doctrinal, and historical influences 
that shape it; Salafi-Jihadism is no different. The first ideological influence traces back to 
the post-WWII timeframe and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt that preached how 
western imperialism had caused a decline in Islam and that the restoration of the caliphate 
was necessary to correct the situation.85 The second major ideological influence comes 
from Salafism, a theological movement within Sunni Islam that is primarily concerned 
with purifying Islam by eradicating idolatry (shirk) and affirming monotheism (tawhid). 
These two schools of thought explain the anti-Shi’ite elements of Salafi-Jihadism as well 
the persecution of those people participating in a democratic system.86 They also 
provided the foundation of the transnational ideology of mobilizing against the near 
enemy of secular governments and the global enemy represented by the West. During this 
time, the ideology was provided a doctrinal basis by Sayyid Qutb, who wrote some of the 
most influential documents within radical Islam.87 In his writings, Qutb rejected Western 
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culture and ideals as bankrupt, promoted Islam as superior to other social systems, and 
advocated that earthly sovereignty is the sole purview of God.88 These writings combined 
with a strict Quranic reading provide the basis for a majority of Islamic terrorist groups 
operating in the Sahel.  
While these doctrinal and ideological influences provide an immensely complex 
framework, there are five main pillars that largely define the Salafi-Jihadist movements 
and are readily found in the agendas of Boko Haram, Ansaru, MUJAO, Ansar-al Dine 
and AQIM. The first, tawhid (monotheism); the second pillar, hakimiyat allah, or God’s 
sovereignty, means that people are incapable of determining right and wrong through 
reasoning. Bida, the third pillar, concerns a rejection of innovations to Islam and propose 
a fundamentalist jurisprudence, arising from the notion that the Quran, as the revelation 
from God is complete and requires no alterations. The fourth pillar, takfir, allows a 
Muslims to be declared outside the faith, something Salafi-Jihadists do to Muslims they 
perceive as having committed a transgression against Islam. This point is particularly 
relevant when understanding the contemporary movements in the Sahel because they 
provide a basis for de-legitimizing secular Muslim governments.89 The last pillar is the 
notion that jihad is an obligation that all Muslims have to rebel against governments that 
are not ruling according to God’s law. This last pillar presents a unique challenge to the 
United States’ counterterrorism policies in the region because the very notion that an 
apostate regime like the United States funds, develops, or defends the governments 
automatically equates that government becoming illegitimate in the eyes of Salafi-
Jihadists. These pillars provide the key to understanding the narrative of Salafi-Jihadist 
groups operating in the Sahel and illustrate why the mere presence of United States 
personnel can exacerbate a situation. Furthermore, it underscores the importance of 
strong states that are capable of developing a counter-narrative that can withstand 
attempts at de-legitimization.  
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As religiously based extremists, Salafi-Jihadists possess a distinct role from 
secular terrorist groups in a number of factors. While ideology plays a central role in all 
terrorist organizations, the religious dimension of radical Islamist organizations imbue 
their ideologies with a sacrosanct quality not found in secular organizations.90 There are 
a number of salient points to draw from this difference between the secular and the 
religious. First, these individuals believe they are carrying out a divine duty, which 
allows them to disregard the secular laws imposed by governments.91 Second, their 
timelines take on an eschatological aspect that extends well past any western political 
timeframe. Third, these group’s Quranic hermeneutics have led them to believe that the 
violence associated with terrorism has been morally sanctioned.92 Lastly, these groups 
have developed a robust narrative that directly attacks the legitimacy of the state.  
2. Origins of Salafi-Jihadism in the Trans-Sahara 
Despite decades of development, it was not until the 1980s that the practices and 
goals of contemporary Salafi-Jihadism emerged and began to evolve into a global 
movement. Beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the ideological 
and doctrinal framework was given a practical outlet through a number of historical 
events that provided Salafi-Jihadists with ideological challenges and opportunities for 
practical training. So, while the ideology that underpins the movement dates back to the 
1950s, the contemporary Salafi-Jihadists structural development traces back to the Soviet 
invasion and occupation of Afghanistan that ended in 1989. The end of this war brought 
scores of jihadi fighters back to North Africa, where their successful fight against an 
infidel power in a Muslim nation, coupled with their fighting acumen (gained after a 
decade of fighting Soviets) emboldened them and put them in direct confrontation with 
regional governments, most notably the government in Algeria.93 From this struggle 
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came the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in 1998, which in 2007 would 
become AQIM. Shortly after rebranding, the group announced that due to their support of 
the apostate Algerian government France was the group’s primary target. This declaration 
against the West was not necessarily new, but the allegiance of the group with the larger 
global jihadist insurgency brought with it material support and increased legitimacy in 
Northwest Africa.  
While the strength of the relationships between AQIM, al-Qaeda, and regional 
groups like Boko Haram and Ansaru remain under debate, the influence of the Salafi-
Jihadist ideology on the region undoubtedly traces back to these developments in 
Afghanistan and Northwest Africa and serves as the common denominator for many of 
the current groups (see figure 3). The aftermath of the September 11th attacks fit easily 
into the developing narrative, with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq delivering 
convenient struggles for many of these Salafi-Jihadists to idealize and, in many cases, 
support. Despite persistent efforts by the United States government to avoid the 
appearances of a war against Islam, many radical Islamists viewed the engagements as 
just that—a war against Islam. With the opening of a de facto front in the Global War on 
Terror—represented by the TSCTP and OEF-TS—in the Sahel, the ideologies of the 
West and the Salafi-Jihadist would come into direct confrontation with one another. 
Later, the popular uprisings that swept across North Africa and the Middle East—loosely 
termed the Arab Spring—increased the reach and appeal of the Salafi-Jihadists.94 After 
many of these revolutions failed to deliver any substantive changes, and others turned 
violent in Libya and Syria, Salafi-Jihadists in West Africa indirectly benefited by an 
increase in ideological struggles to champion, while directly benefiting from the 
increased flow of weapons flowing from Libya.95 While many of the terrorist groups 
remained content to focus on the near enemy during the initial years, the 2012 coup d’état 
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in Mali, the 2013 attack on the In Amenas gas plant in Eastern Algeria, and Boko 
Haram’s professed allegiance to ISIS seem to suggest a growing international mindset 
within many of these groups that will threaten regions and interests outside the Sahel.  
 
 
Figure 3.  The AQIM Ecosystem.96  
Salafi-Jihadism differs from other forms of political Islam. These groups are not 
merely against the Christian populations and secular facets of these states, but other 
Muslims as well.97 For example, the Salafists condemn Sufism, the form of Islam 
practiced in much of West Africa, as non-Islamic.98 As such, Salafi-Jihadists maintain a 
complex and adversarial relationship with the larger Muslim community. Pejorative 
concepts like bida, takfir, and jihad that all allow for intra-Muslim condemnation 
certainly provides Islamic leaders with reason enough to denounce these groups. 
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Likewise, the violent tactics employed by many of these groups undoubtedly trouble the 
average Muslim faithful. Despite this evidence, Muslims remain conflicted and many 
remain reluctant to disavow other Muslims. To understand the complex dynamics behind 
this reluctance, the problem must be understood as an existential problem, not merely a 
political or social problem. Salafi-Jihadists draw from the same religious sources as other 
Muslims; they adeptly exploit and employ religious rhetoric and symbols to advance their 
cause. According to Assaf Moghadam of the Combating Terrorism Center this is the 
“reason that ordinary Muslims—not to speak of non-Muslims—find it particularly 
difficult and dangerous to challenge Salafi-Jihadists without running the risk of being 
accused of targeting Islam as a whole.”99 This explains how the crimes imputed to Salafi- 
Jihadists do not garner the level of condemnation one would expect; however, this silence 
does not equate to affirmation by the larger Islamic community. Many Muslims in 
communities throughout the Sahel where these groups operate find the violence 
reprehensible, but lack the resources to counter the violence on their own. The ineffectual 
state responses leave these Muslims stuck between a rock and a hard place, which Salafi-
Jihadist groups deftly manipulate. In addition to safety concerns, many Muslims living in 
the Sahel lack access to reliable media outlets that can offer a reliable counter-narrative to 
that being pushed by the Salafi-Jihadist groups. The United States government went to 
great lengths to characterize the Global War on Terror and its more recent incarnations as 
campaigns against terrorism and violent extremist ideologies—not as a war against 
Islam.100 However, this characterization likely did not reach many Muslim citizens in the 
Sahel due to their limited access to information and distrust of Western intentions. 
Conversely, the Salafi-Jihadists directly acknowledge that they are acting on behalf of 
Islam—a narrative that does reach the ordinary Muslim.  
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3. The Rise of Salafi-Jihadism in the Sahel 
As mentioned previously, the history of Salafi-Jihadism is grounded in the fight 
against foreign non-Muslim occupiers. Initially the Soviets in Afghanistan, it later 
became the United States and its Western partners in the Middle East. This struggle, or 
jihad, against foreign non-Muslim powers was well suited to transfer to Northwest 
Africa, where many governments draw their design and empowerment from colonial 
systems. In an effort to control populations, these colonial systems exploited fissures in 
ethnicity and religion to divide people and keep the indigenous population weakened. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the increased presence of the United States that came 
with the TSCTP, OEF-TS, and the creation of AFRICOM permeated radical Muslim 
thought in the region. This perception coupled with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, that 
were creating a number of well trained and radicalizing jihadists only served to add to the 
problem. Lastly, the weak and ineffectual governments that define the political landscape 
of the Sahel provide ample room for Salafi-Jihadists to operate and radicalize locally 
disenfranchised populations. Perhaps the most recent effects were the post-Qaddafi 
situation in Libya, were scores of fighter and countless weapons were shipped across the 
Trans-Sahara and elsewhere.  
The United States’ understanding of the threat posed by Salafi extremism in the 
Sahel region has evolved over the years since counterterrorism efforts began in earnest. 
Initially something seen as a local threat, Salafi-Jihadism began to be seen as a regional 
threat after a number of high-profile attacks on Western interests occurred.101 Despite 
this elevation, the threat that the Salafi-Jihadists posed (along with terrorism in general) 
to regional stability was still underemphasized and mainly viewed as something directed 
at U.S. interests in the region. In 2009, Lilianne Kennedy-Boudali gave testimony before 
the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African 
Affairs that purported that insecurity in the Sahel was primarily the result of corruption, 
civil conflict, smuggling, and trafficking—not terrorism.102 The 2010 resurgence of Boko 
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Haram and the 2012 chaos in Mali, illustrated that the threat of Salafi-Jihadism also 
possessed the potential for widespread destabilization. This new appreciation of the threat 
led to a renewed discussion of the security-development nexus that Lilianne Kennedy-
Boudali mentioned when discussing insecurity in the Sahel requires a regional approach 
that incorporates programs designed to address the underlying causes that allow violent 
extremism ideologies to spread.103  
C. STATE CAPACITY IN THE SAHEL 
United States counterterrorism efforts in the Trans-Sahara developed from the 
conception that weak states provide an environment amenable to the growth of terrorism. 
This belief is contrary to the long accepted wisdom that terrorism was a tactic reserved 
for the weak to use against an overwhelmingly strong state.104 From the outset, 
counterterrorism initiatives intended to emphasize “the holistic nature of 
counterterrorism, by addressing such things as security sector reform, democratic 
accountability, development of public consensus, professionalism of military forces, and 
respect for human rights and the rule of law.”105 Understanding the limited capacity of 
the Sahelian states is a key element in appreciating the strategic environment of the 
Trans-Sahara. Given the transnational nature of many of the Salafi-Jihadist groups in the 
Sahel, the forthcoming analysis of state capacity will incorporate data from all eleven 
TSCTP countries. In doing so, a more comprehensive regional picture develops that lends 
itself to better comparison and shows the larger trends that impact the efficacy of United 
States counterterrorism initiatives.  
In order to define state capacity, it is first necessary to define the state. The 
classical definition proposed by Max Weber deemed the state “a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
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territory.”106 Since Weber’s definition, the view of state capacity has expanded into a 
multidimensional concept that includes the state’s bureaucratic and administrative 
capacity to provide public goods; legal capacity in the form of border protection and the 
rule of law; infrastructural capacity to exercise control throughout the entirety of 
territory; and extractive capacity in the form of raising revenues.107 As such, the United 
States’ whole of government strategy for countering terrorism in the Trans-Sahara 
attempts to address directly and indirectly these various levels and their interdependence. 
Considering that the United States attempts to work through and with these African 
partners to counter violent extremism and terrorism, the limited state capacity of these 
countries greatly affects the efficacy of counterterrorism initiatives. A review of state 
capacity in the region illustrates that the Sahelian nations of the Trans-Sahara region 
remain weak and incapable of fulfilling many of the basic functions of a state outside the 
capital cities.  
Research shows that state capacity in the Sahel remains problematic. Analysis of 
defense spending, social spending, unemployment rates, economic factors, and indices 
that measure human development and corruption establishes a comprehensive snapshot of 
the status of limited state capacity in the region. Data from the World Bank, the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, and other organizations show that the countries of the Sahel have seen small 
fluctuations in their defense expenditures since 2000.108 Meanwhile, manpower changes 
were scattered, with Senegal and Nigeria registering the largest increases—21% and 
51.2% respectively—and Chad, Mali, and Niger registering a decrease or no change at 
all. This data shows there is no correlation between United States counterterrorism 
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spending in the Sahel and an increase in defense expenditures in African partners. 
Furthermore, average defense expenditures throughout the Sub-Saharan Africa region 
average 1.5% of GDP while the Middle East/North African region averages 5.3% of 
GDP, illustrating that all TSCTP countries—excluding Mauritania—remain well within 
the average for their respective regions. Similarly, data shows that the TSCTP countries 
averaged a 1.3% increase in manpower from the period of 2000–2012. The outliers were 
Senegal and Nigeria, which registered large increases in overall manpower during the 
period, and Mali, which saw a sharp decrease. These outliers could have political 
explanations, as both Senegal and Nigeria have been dealing with insurgencies and Mali 
experienced a coup d’état; however, that analysis exceeds the intent and scope of this 
paper. Lastly, any assessment of military spending must acknowledge the possibility that 
not all defense expenditures leave administrative traces.  
Defense expenditures provide explicit information toward a country’s efforts 
toward defense; however, the impact that an increase or decrease in defense spending has 
on social spending provides a more holistic understanding of a state’s capacity. Without a 
sustained investment in social and economic development, the narrowly focused 
counterterrorism efforts will merely disrupt violent extremism because of a failure to 
address the fundamental causes that allow these extremist ideologies to flourish in the 
first place. Addressing effects, without redressing the causes is like playing “whack a 
mole”—the one holding the hammer eventually tires. As Gilles Yabi from the 
International Crisis Group argues, “the more young people are able to be employed the 
less chances there are that they can be recruited by militant groups.”109 Furthermore, a 
2012 paper published by the African Center for Strategic Studies contends that poverty, 
unemployment, and socioeconomic deprivation are among the leading explanations for 
the rise of violent extremist organizations.110 The idea that there is a social and economic 
side to countering terrorism, along with the military operations, certainly exists in the 
TSCTPs “whole of government” approach. For the purposes of this paper, social 
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spending is measured in terms of unemployment and annual government expenditures 
(total percentage of GDP) on education and health because these factors are generally 
considered the main drivers of social instability.  
World Bank data on education shows that primary and secondary school 
enrollment increased in all TSCTP countries, except Nigeria, between 2004 and 2013. 
According to data from the World Health Organization total expenditures on health (as 
percentage of GDP) in 2012 compared to 2002, shows that only Chad and Mali registered 
decreases, while Algeria, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia all registered 
slightly more than a 1% increase.111 Meanwhile, unemployment remained relatively 
static—less than a 0.2% change—from 2000 to 2012, with the exception of Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Algeria all realizing a decline in unemployment, with Algeria realizing a 
nearly 20% decrease.112 On the one hand, this disparate data illustrates the complex 
nature of society, economics, and politics, but it also highlights that investment in health 
and education has barely increased over the past 15 years and chronic unemployment 
plagues many of these countries. This explains why many of the countries continually 
rank low on a number of global indices.  
Despite the modest increases in social expenditures, the countries of the Sahel 
ranked in the bottom 20% of the United Nations’ most recent Human Development 
Index—a measure of quality of life issues like life expectancy and standard of living—
with Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger making up four of the bottom ten.113 While 
these countries have all been slowly improving since the 2000 Human Development 
Index, the changes have not kept up with the pace of terrorism in the region. Similar data 
from The Human Capital Report 2013 published by the World Economic Forum, which 
measures four pillars—education, health, employment, enabling environment—shows 
that all the TSCTP countries rank in the bottom of the index, with all but Morocco and 
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Tunisia being in the bottom 20% (Chad and Niger were not measured).114 Again, 
measured against data from 2000, it is shows that the countries are making some 
progress, but not quickly enough to counter the powerful rise of terrorism in the region.  
Considering the important role that good governance plays in strong state 
capacity, and the United States’ counterterrorism policies, looking at the status of 
governance in the region provides another important dimension. The Economic Freedom 
rankings—a measure of freedom from corruption, financial freedom, and business 
freedom—show that Trans-Saharan countries routinely rank in the bottom half of 
countries evaluated. For example, in the 2014 rankings Burkina Faso—ranked 98—was 
the only Trans-Saharan country to rank in the top half. Morocco—103; Tunisia—109; 
Mali—122; Senegal—125; Niger—127; Nigeria—129; and Mauritania—134 all scored 
poorly, while Algeria—146—and Chad—167—possessed some of the poorest rankings 
in Africa.115 More telling is the fact that eight countries (only Morocco and Niger were 
exceptions) declined from the 2009 rankings and all countries saw a decline in their 
scores from 2006.116 While these results highlight the fact that economic freedom is 
declining within the region, it does not speak to the cause of this decline. There is, 
however, a correlation between the limited economic freedom and the rise of illicit 
economic activities, which support terrorism. As Vanda Felbab-Brown and James J.F. 
Forest write, “The presence of illicit economies may attract terrorists into a particular 
location, where they offer themselves as protectors of the population against the 
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deficiencies of the state and the predatory behavior of criminal groups, and in return they 
expect to receive local support for their group.”117  
There are a number of larger trends that appear throughout the data. First, a 
majority of TSCTP countries have seen slight increases in their social spending over the 
past decade. However, these slight increases in social spending are coupled by 
persistently high rates of unemployment. Second, there have been no significant changes 
in defense spending throughout the region, suggesting that one of the basic elements of 
state capacity remain underdeveloped. Third, and perhaps most problematic, is the 
decline that these countries registered in the areas of governance and freedom. Therefore, 
while the United States through the TSCTP, OEF-TS, and other initiatives has 
dramatically increased the amount it spends on countering terrorism in the Sahel and the 
Maghreb region, this has not caused the African partners to follow suit. As the data 
shows, regional defense expenditures have not increased notably over the past fourteen 
years, nor has social spending decreased in any meaningful way. Limited economic 
freedom, widespread corruption, and poor governance still plague most countries—
factors that contribute to an unstable society—and need to be addressed to avoid 
inequality and social grievances being exploited by violent extremism organizations and 
terrorists. When this low human development is coupled with high levels of violence, the 
states remains weak. This causes tensions within the United States’ whole of government 
approach to countering terrorism in the region because the situation requires an emphasis 
on security over political goals.  
The limited state capacity that defines these states presents two distinct problems 
for counterterrorism efforts—one internal, one external. First, there is the inability of the 
states to combat violent extremism and terrorism. The inability of the state to exert 
control over its borders makes the region highly susceptible for transnational operations 
like smuggling, kidnapping, and human trafficking, which finance terrorist organizations. 
The limited presence of rule of law makes prosecution of terrorist activity improbable; 
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severely curbing the effect that such punishments traditionally have on potential recruits 
and undermining the faith citizens have in jurisprudence. The limited extractive capacity 
of states to collect taxes puts limitations on social programs that may be used to improve 
the socio-economic situation and develop a counter-narrative to that of the violent 
extremists. Lastly, the political limitations associated with these weak states make the 
development of national agendas difficult, further limiting the ability of the federal 
governments to develop legitimacy in the eyes of all the citizenry. The second problem is 
the insular nature of many of these states. The inability or unwillingness to look past their 
own borders means they are often unable to absorb and benefit from all the available 
United States counterterrorism programs—to truly be partners. Additionally, it means 
they are unable to work effectively with neighbors and regional organizations. Taken 
together, these two limitations present a significant impediment to successfully 
countering terrorism in the region. The nexus between state security, transnational 
criminal activity, and extremist financing demands regional collaboration, requiring these 
states to look past their own borders and develop more comprehensive national priorities.  
Rather than a tactical response to powerful states, terrorism in the Sahel exploits 
the weak state. Congressional leaders have expressed concern about the negative impact 
that weak state capacity has on counterterrorism programs in the Trans-Sahara region. 
Referencing an environment “in which coups, instability, and concerns about human 
rights abuses constitute historical and often ongoing risks” the 2014 National Defense 
Authorization Act by the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 
recommended that the Department of Defense and the Department of State focus “on 
developing long-term regional counterterrorism capabilities.”118 In addition to criticizing 
the management of United States counterterrorism programs, this report demonstrates the 
pitfalls of policies where success is dependent upon the recipient state’s capacity to 
translate funding and training into demonstrable changes within their military and 
security framework. The importance of strong states in countering terrorism cannot be 
overstated. Studies confirm that a society’s access to resources vis-à-vis state institutions 
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has a demonstrable impact on the severity of conflicts.119 In cases where certain 
segments of society feel they have no alternative access to resources, they are likely to 
take up arms against the government or provide support for those fighting against the 
government. Terrorists and violent extremist organizations easily exploit weak or non-
existing state capacity. In a 2012 Foreign Policy article on the ten causes for state failure, 
six of the ten are directly tied to weak institutions that are unable to provide public 
services: “lack of property rights; no law and order; a weak central government; political 
exploitation; forced labor; and bad public services.”120 The impact these weak states have 
on United States counterterrorism efforts are manifold, as planners must work around the 
dearth of indigenous political, social, economic, and military infrastructure to produce 
infrastructure capable of sustaining operations and achieving the end-state. 
D. SUMMARY 
After more than a decade of counterterrorism efforts in the Trans-Saharan region, 
the efficacy of the United States’ policies in the region remains contestable. Data shows 
that counterterrorism efforts have not militarized the Sahel and that, despite some 
programmatic challenges, the counterterrorism initiatives remain appropriately funded. 
Similarly, data illustrates that domestic funding for social programs has not significantly 
decreased over the intervening years, demonstrating the reality of the whole of 
government approach that the United States’ counterterrorism policies rely on so heavily. 
Despite these positive indicators, Salafi-Jihadism has risen steadily since 2001 and 
constitutes a significant threat to the region. In addition, the improvement of state 
capacity continues to move at a sluggish pace across the region, undermining any 
substantive changes. These trends illustrate the sometimes-contradictory nature of 
political goals and security goals in the Sahel, which severely impact counterterrorism 
initiatives.  
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III. EVALUATION OF CASE STUDIES 
This section examines three case studies of Salafi-Jihadist terrorism in the Sahel. 
After defining the terrorist organizations and providing an overview of their activities, 
each case study juxtaposes the group against the state response during the same time 
period. While Salafi-Jihadism threatens the entire Trans-Sahara region, it is particularly 
prevalent throughout the Sahel, where Boko Haram, Ansaru, MUJAO, and AQIM have 
exploited unstable states and exploited the ethno-national fissures to gain a foothold. 
Boko Haram’s 2009 resurgence in Nigeria brought unprecedented levels of violence to 
the region, which continues unabated. Meanwhile, AQIM, Ansar Al-Dine, and MUJAO 
supported and exploited the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA) in their quest to control Northern Mali. While a French-led intervention 
eventually restored order to Northern Mali, the government in Bamako continues to 
struggle with terrorism. In Mauritania, the only Islamist Republic in the Sahel, terrorist 
attacks have been less prevalent than elsewhere, but it has served as a hub for AQIM 
operations since the early 2000s. Each case provides a unique dimension to the terrorism 
problem in the Sahel and illustrates the role that the state response plays in the continued 
presence of the terrorist organizations.  
A. BOKO HARAM AND ANSARU IN NIGERIA 
Religious extremism has been on the rise in Nigeria since the 1980s; these 
extremist views, when politicized, lay the groundwork for groups like Boko Haram. 
Beginning with the Maitatsine uprisings in the early 1980s, decades of politicization and 
religious propaganda created an ethno-religious divide that exists in Nigeria today, which 
Boko Haram successfully exploits.121 The underlying basis for this development is the 
socioeconomic distress that many Muslim men face and the perceived illegitimacy of the 
federal government.122 Successive governments have struggled with corruption, 
inefficiency, and extreme poverty, all of which continue to undermine the legitimacy of 
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the government in Abuja. Perhaps most importantly, military and security forces are 
routinely accused of human rights abuses when dealing with suspected terrorists and the 
local population. Exacerbating the situation, Nigeria’s position as a regional hegemon 
constrains its ability to recognize the need for regional cooperation regarding terrorism.  
Typical of the region, Nigeria (see figure 4) was still a nascent democracy in 2002 
when the United States current counterterrorism strategy went into effect. President 
Obasanjo, the first democratically elected president, won re-election in 2003 amidst 
significant ethnic and religious violence.123 During his second term, the politico-military 
group Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) represented the 
largest terrorism threat to Nigeria — largely a result of the new oil discoveries in the 
Niger Delta. The group, while still in existence, ceased their terrorist activities after an 
amnesty program and the Nigerian government in 2009 offered monetary negotiations.124 
During this time the group that would eventually become Boko Haram remained 
relatively unknown. Locally known as Jama’atul Ahlul Sunna wa Liddawati wal Jihad, 
Boko Haram is a radical Islamic sect operating in northern Nigeria. Believing that “non-
believers” should not rule Muslims, Boko Haram seeks to impose Sharia law on the 
entire country.125 Unlike MEND and other typical nationalist organizations, Boko Haram 
expresses no interest in participating in the political process. Their willingness to attacks 
civilians—Muslims and Christians alike—provides another distinct component of Boko 
Haram and traces back to the Salafi-Jihadist principle of takfir.  
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Figure 4.  Map of Nigeria.126 
The exact origins and ideological beginnings of Boko Haram have not been 
clearly defined, but it is generally agreed that the group began as a non-violent religious 
study group.127 The religious study group formed in Maiduguri, Nigeria, and was initially 
led by Mohammed Yusuf. After clashes with Nigerian security forces in 2003—which 
appear to have militarized Yusuf—the group remained relatively quiet, attempting only a 
few unsuccessful attacks on Nigerian security forces. In 2009, after numerous arrests of 
Yusuf in the intervening years, Nigerian security forces cracked down on the group. 
Fighting between Nigerian security forces and Yusuf’s followers broke out in the 
northern provinces of Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe, which ended with the capture and 
extrajudicial killing of Yusuf by Nigerian security forces.128 Afterwards, the groups 
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remained quiet for the next year, until Abubakar Shekau reemerged from prison claiming 
to be the new leader of the group and promising renewed attacks.129 Further proof of the 
ideological and material support provided by AQIM comes in the actions of AQIM after 
Nigerian Security Forces killed Mohammed Yusuf and 800 of his followers in 2009. 
AQIM leadership offered assistance to Boko Haram to revenge the killings. In the 
aftermath of the killings, many of Yusuf’s followers fled Nigeria, with the notable 
exception of Shekau, who security forces detained and imprisoned. During this time, 
Mamman Nur fled to East Africa were he reportedly trained with al-Shabaab in 
Somalia.130 Upon returning to Nigeria, Nur masterminded the bombing of the United 
Nations Headquarters in Abuja on 26 August 2011.131 Having lost the ensuing fight over 
leadership of Boko Haram, Nur’s ideological influence ceased and he has since aligned 
himself with Ansaru, where his internationalist ideology and pedigree have more 
influence.132 These leaders—Nur and Shekau—deftly maneuver through the fractured 
Nigerian political system and exploit the porous borders with Chad and Cameroon to 
avoid capture.  
Since reemerging, Boko Haram has increasingly terrorized Nigeria, attacking 
Western interests and increasing ties with AQIM and other violent extremist 
organizations in the Trans-Sahara. From 2009–2013, the National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) reports that Boko Haram 
conducted 808 attacks, resulting in 3,666 fatalities, which accounted for six percent of 
terrorist attacks globally.133 According to the latest United Nations’ reports, the 
insurgency caused more than 13,000 deaths and displaced more than 1.5 million 
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people.134 In addition to the sheer number and volatility of these incidents, their attacks 
have been brutal and often directly targeted civilians. After the 2011 bombing of the 
United Nations Headquarters, bombings continued throughout 2012 targeting Catholic 
churches, civilians, and tourists. “Amid growing concern about the escalating violence,” 
the Nigerian government “declared a state of emergency in May 2013 in the three 
northern states where Boko Haram is the strongest - Borno, Yobe and Adamawa.”135 In 
addition, a Joint Task Force was established to drive Boko Haram from the cities to limit 
their influence and disperse the members.136 Throughout the re-emergence and escalation 
of Boko Haram, Goodluck Jonathan has been president. Elected in 2010 after serving as 
interim President following the death of President Yar’Adua, Goodluck Jonathan became 
defined by the Boko Haram insurgency.137 His handling of the situation drew significant 
criticism in Nigeria and throughout the international community and further damaged the 
legitimacy of the state in the eyes of many northern Nigerians who bore the brunt of the 
violence.  
In 2013, the Department of State designated Boko Haram “a terrorist 
organization, amid fears that it had developed links with militant groups such as” AQIM 
to wage a global jihad.138 Government officials in Nigeria, who wished to delegitimize 
the increasing influence of Boko Haram, met this designation with hesitancy. Despite this 
public acknowledgement of Boko Haram’s significance, the group did not truly come 
into worldwide prominence until it kidnapped 275 girls from a school in Borno State in 
April 2014. This event seemingly catapulted Boko Haram from a middling local threat to 
Nigeria into a globally recognized threat. International media reporting after the event 
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skyrocketed, congressional lawmakers in the United States were prompted to offer 
intelligence and logistical support, and the Nigerian public began pressuring the 
government of Goodluck Jonathan for solutions.139 Despite the unprecedented emphasis 
on countering Boko Haram, the group continued to get stronger, and launch increasingly 
deadlier attacks throughout the country (see Figure 5). Furthermore, the group is 
becoming more international, as evidenced by the August 2014 report that “Shekau 
declared a caliphate in areas under Boko Haram’s control and praised Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, leader of ISIS and self-declared caliph—ruler—of  Muslims worldwide.”140 In 
2015, the group continued to elevate its violence, and over a period of four days in early 
January laid siege to the town of Baga in Northeastern Nigeria. After overrunning a 
Nigerian army base, the group went on to kill an estimated 2,000 civilians, destroyed 
dozens of towns, and displace an estimated 35,000 people.141 This level of violence 
against a civilian population now ranks Boko Haram as the deadliest terror group in 
Africa, and one of the most lethal in the world.  
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Figure 5.  Map of Boko Haram Attacks.142  
Boko Haram, despite its loose organizational structure, does operate an estimated 
200–300 training camps.143 Offering training courses that last anywhere from two to 
twelve months, these camps are producing enough new radical jihadists to absorb the 
casualties that Boko Haram sustains through their engagements with Nigerian security 
forces. In addition to the ideological trappings of such an organization, there are financial 
incentives that tap into the socioeconomic distress that plagues much of Nigeria. Recruits 
received a €100 joining fee, while military action earns €1,000, and acquiring weapons 
garners them a €2,000 reward.144 This suggests that Boko Haram maintains a practical 
outlook, understanding that not every recruit will be ideologically motivated. 
Furthermore, it illustrates the economic ability of Boko Haram to counter the weak and 
corrupt Nigerian state, where the average annual household income is $3,000 a year and 
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almost “70 % of the population lives below the poverty line.”145 In addition, these figures 
also speak toward state capacity, as Nigeria is now the largest economy in Africa and 
24th largest economy in the world.146 However, the $510 billion dollar economy has 
failed to transfer any of that wealth to the people and wealth disparity continues to 
separate the masses from the elite, and the northern states from the southern.  
Boko Haram’s organization has not been wholly embraced by all Salafi-Jihadists 
in Nigeria, some of who take issue with the violent tactics employed against Muslims. 
These differences have caused splits within the group and resulted in the January 2012 
arrival of Ansaru, which announced its existence via a broadcast statement.147 The group, 
whose full Arabic name is Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, which loosely 
translates to “Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa,” denounced 
Boko Haram’s targeting of Muslims, stating they would only target Muslims in self-
defense.148 This tactical difference, coupled with their more international ideology is 
likely the result of Mohammed Nur’s influence, again showing the ideological influence 
of AQIM. While Ansaru’s international goals put them more in line with AQIM, their 
shared goal of overthrowing the secular government of Nigeria has seen them partner 
with the Malian-based MUJAO on matters of mutual interest.149 Furthermore, many of 
the members appear to freely flow back to Boko Haram suggesting that the groups are 
willing to put tactical differences aside for the achievement of the larger goal of an 
Islamic caliphate.  
In Ansaru’s short existence they proved to be a formidable threat against local and 
western interests. In keeping with their more international agenda, the group kidnapped a 
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French citizen working for an engineering company in Katsina, Nigeria, in December 
2012.150 After the attack, “Ansaru warned France that it would continue launching 
attacks against the French government and French citizens until France ends its ban on 
the Islamic veil and its ‘major role’ in the planned intervention in northern Mali.”151 On 
January 19, 2013, Ansaru claimed responsibility for an ambush on a convoy of Nigerian 
soldiers en route to Mali, killing two soldiers.152 In a released statement, Ansaru claimed 
the troops “were aiming to demolish the Islamic Empire of Mali” and warned African 
countries to “stop helping Western countries fight Muslims.”153 A month later, Ansaru 
conducted two separate attacks, assaulting a prison and then kidnapping seven foreign 
engineers in the Bauchi State in northeastern Nigeria; they later announced the “seven 
Christian foreigners” had been executed.154 After Operation Serval successfully defeated 
the coalition of Islamist militants in Northern Mali, it appears that Ansaru disbanded, 
with many members returning to Boko Haram.155 Although verifying the membership of 
these groups is difficult given their cellular nature, the fluidity of membership 
underscores the resilience of the ideology and the desirability of working for these 
extremist organizations.  
In an effort to develop the administrative and legal capacity of the Nigerian 
government, counterterrorism funding supports a variety of initiatives in Nigeria.156 The 
United States established a counter terrorist financing unit, which attempts to disrupt the 
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financial resources that Boko Haram uses to support its recruitment efforts and 
terrorism.157 In addition, funding has been used to train civilian agencies throughout 
Nigeria, like customs agents, immigration agents, and employees of the National 
Emergency Management Agency. Complimenting these efforts have been initiatives 
tailored to the training of law enforcement personnel—specifically the Nigerian Police 
Force—to improve law enforcement capacity to prevent, detect, and investigate terrorism 
threats; effectively deal with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are a common 
tactic of Boko Haram; and strengthen border security to prevent transnational criminal 
agents from exploiting the fluid environment of the Sahel. To develop the coercive and 
infrastructural capacity of the government of Nigeria, counterterrorism funding has been 
used for programs designed to professionalize military units that will deploy to the 
Northeast to counter Boko Haram.158 The professionalization of the Nigerian Army is 
critical, as their extrajudicial tactics often cause deaths, providing Boko Haram with 
evidence of the inability of a secular government to effectively govern.159 There are also 
initiatives specifically designed to address the development of the Northeast region, in an 
effort to counter the underlying socioeconomic issues that support and sustain terrorist 
recruitment.160 All these efforts intend to disrupt terrorism at its roots, limiting Boko 
Haram’s recruitment pool, and countering the message that Boko Haram spreads 
regarding the inefficacy and illegitimacy of the secular government in Abuja.  
 Recognizing that state legitimacy plays a crucial role in defeating the terrorist 
narrative, the United States, in conjunction with the government of Nigeria launched the 
Nigeria Regional Transition Initiative (NRTI) to “improve stability and strengthen 
                                                 
157 “Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Terrorist Financing,” United States Department of State, May 
10, 2015, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/c/crime/c44634.htm.  
158 “Boko Haram and U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance to Nigeria,” United States Department of 
State, May 14, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226072.htm.  
159 “Joint Trask Force (JTF) Nigeria,” Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, June 1, 2015, 
http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/joint-task-force-jtf-nigeria.  
160 “Fact Sheet: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government in its Fight Against Boko Haram,” 
Whitehouse, White House, October 14, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/14/fact-
sheet-us-efforts-assist-nigerian-government-its-fight-against-boko-haram.  
 55 
democratic institutions in northeast Nigeria.”161 The NRTI focuses on “building the 
resistance of communities vulnerable to the effects of violent extremist organizations, 
weak governance, and insecurity through increased positive engagement between 
government and communities; increased access to credible information; and support to 
reduce youth vulnerability to violent extremist influences.”162 Despite these efforts to 
improve legitimacy in the North, progress remains slow. Nigeria, organized under a 
federal structure similar to that of the United States, remains limited by the politics and 
policies of the individual states. The constitutional authority vested in the states means 
that the federal government finds itself fighting the battle for legitimacy on two fronts: as 
a secular government against religious extremists and as a weak federal government 
against strong states. The Nigerian Governors Forum, widely regarded as the strongest 
political bloc in Nigeria and an oft-used scapegoat by former President Goodluck 
Jonathan when explaining the persistence of the Boko Haram insurgency, illustrates the 
power of the states.163 These fissures make real change difficult and play easily into the 
narrative of Salafi-Jiahadist’s who point to the states’ illegitimacy and repression of 
Muslims.  
In addition to the problems that exist within the federal government, the heavy-
handed tactics employed by the Nigerian security forces have only served to exacerbate 
the problems underlying the Boko Haram insurgency.164 The Department of State 
acknowledged as much during a question and answer session that accompanied the 
designation of Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.165 The repercussions of 
such tactics date back to the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 and 
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continue to undermine the legitimacy of the state in many rural areas that rely primarily 
on word of mouth to receive their news. Stories like these provide Boko Haram recruiters 
with evidence to promote their jihad against the corrupt and secular government. 
Additionally, these crimes limit counterterrorism assistance from the United States 
because of rules that prevent the training of personnel complicit in human rights 
abuses.166 Similar to the situation that results after a coup d’état, the limitations imposed 
on training potential human rights abusers interrupts the ability of the state to develop its 
capacity. Given the chaotic environment that surrounds these military operations, 
oftentimes entire units fall under investigation impacting more than just the individual 
actors.  
As the regional hegemon, Nigeria, and its Boko Haram insurgency, represents a 
security problem for the entire region. Now the largest economy in Africa, Nigeria has 
only slightly increased defense expenditures over the past 14 years from 0.8% to 1.0% of 
the GDP, now currently standing at $2.4 billion.167 Despite the modest increase in 
defense spending, Nigeria’s military manpower increased more than any other country in 
the region, going from 106,500 in 2000 to 162,000 personnel in 2013, an increase of 
52%.168 However, the largest portion of that increase—50.7%—occurred between 2000 
and 2001, before current counterterrorism initiatives were in place. Arms imports during 
this time comprised very few combat weapons and none were supplied by the United 
States.169 This data illustrates that there has not been a significant increase in the security 
capacity of the state. Despite being a recipient of United States counterterrorism 
assistance for a decade, the government continues to be one of the most corrupt and 
inefficient in the region. While the recent election of President Muhammud Buhari—a 
popular candidate in the North—possesses the potential to stop the downward spiral, 
Boko Haram’s activities will present a significant challenge to the new presidency.  
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B. ANSAR AL-DINE, AQIM, AND MUJAO IN MALI 
Despite the complexity of the security situation in the Sahel, recent discussions 
regarding the region have been dominated by the situation in Mali (see Figure 6). The 
2012 coup d’état and rebellion in the North quickly became a lightning rod for criticism 
of United States counterterrorism efforts in the Trans-Sahara.170 Critics who quip that the 
United States military is training the next coup leaders—an oft-used trope in the 
militarization debate—were seemingly vindicated. Similarly, the slow and ineffectual 
response by regional organizations showed that regional cooperation—a critical 
component of any counterterrorism strategy in the geographically challenging Sahel—is 
still a long way off. Setting these criticisms aside, the most alarming aspect of the crisis 
in Mali was the rapidity with which the situation in the state deteriorated. The years of 
relative stability belied an undercurrent of issues that played into the hands of local and 
regional Salafi-Jihadist organizations that had long been operating throughout the 
country’s north. In addition, the modus vivendi that defined the disparate insurgent 
groups operating in the North was a stark contrast to the limited regional cooperation. 
Similar to the circumstances in Mauritania, there are exogenous and endogenous aspects 
that explain the resurgence of terrorism in Mali. In addition to the weak state, the poor 
socioeconomic situation, and corrupt political system, the external shock resulting from 
the deteriorating situation in Libya reverberated in Mali. The situation shows the 
precarious condition of Sahelian states and the pitfalls of counterterrorism efforts within 
states that lack capacity 
 
                                                 





Figure 6.  Map of Mali.171  
After the 2012 coup d’état, AQIM, Ansar-al Dine, and MUJAO pushed into 
northern Mali around the city of Gao in an attempt to exploit the weakened rule of law 
and disenfranchised Tuareg population. While AQIM remains a primarily Algerian 
organization, it has numerous ties to the larger Salafi-Jihadist problem in the Sahel. 
Whether providing ideological support, material support, or logistical support, the 
group’s influence is evident throughout the Sahel. In addition, the group has been directly 
involved in a number of incidents in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria ranging from 
suicide bombings and armed attacks to kidnapping and ransom operations. The most 
demonstrable impact AQIM had outside Algeria occurred in the months after a coup 
d’état toppled the government in Mali. AQIM exploited the weak northern areas, allying 
with disenfranchised Islamic Tuareg group Ansar al-Dine and MUJAO to take control of 
large portions of territory. Despite the secular nature of the original revolt, AQIM and 
their allies maintained control of significant portions of territory in Northern Mali, 
instituting Sharia Law and persecuting the largely Sufi population. It took the French-led 
Operation Serval later in the year to halt their advances on the capital city of Bamako and 
push these groups out of Mali.  
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According to the Global Terrorism Database, there were 166 terrorist incidents in 
Mali from 2002–2014, with a vast majority occurring after 2011— five-fold increase in 
terrorist attacks when compared against the preceding twelve years.172 In contrast to the 
situation in Nigeria and Mauritania where Boko Haram and AQIM dominate the terrorist 
landscape, the situation in Mali epitomizes the chaotic and overlapping nature of 
terrorism in the Sahel. As one of the original members of the Pan-Sahel Initiative, Mali, 
like Mauritania, has received a significant amount of U.S. counterterrorism assistance. In 
addition, Mali, as a democratic poster child in the region, received large amounts of 
humanitarian and financial aid as well.173 Nonetheless, Mali’s status as a democratic 
darling had inauspicious beginnings. Despite President Konaré’s adherence to the term-
limits imposed by the Malian constitution, the 2002 democratic election of General 
Amadou Toure sparked widespread calls of fraud; however, Western leaders welcomed 
the results.174 While there was significant terrorist activity emanating within nearby 
Algeria due to the GSPC’s activities, there were no terrorist activities in Mali from 2002 
until 2007.175 This lack of terrorism however, did not mean that serious fissures were not 
present, laying the groundwork for discontent.  
During these years, Tuareg insurgents in the north who were dissatisfied with the 
socioeconomic situation in Northern Mali posed the main threats. In May 2007, President 
Toure won reelection again with serious objections from opposition groups; again the 
West accepted the results of an election characterized as “generally free and fair.”176 
Shortly afterwards, Tuareg rebels killed ten people in Tinzaouatene in Northeastern Mali, 
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which began a two-year period considered the third Tuareg rebellion.177 Over the 
remaining months of 2007 and throughout 2008, there were twelve more terrorist attacks 
in Northern Mali, each attributed to Tuareg rebels.178 These rebellions, while not directly 
linked to the rising influence of Salafi-Jihadism in the region, certainly destabilized the 
northern regions of Mali (see Figure 7). As the successive peace agreements that 
accompanied these rebellions slowly eroded the power of the central government in Mali, 
a security vacuum emerged, ripe for exploitation by jihadists.  
After years of operating in northern Mali, the recently re-branded AQIM 
perpetrated its first operations in Mali in January 2009 with the kidnapping of four 
European tourists. The attack, initially thought to be the work of Tuareg rebels, was 
eventually linked to AQIM operatives.179 The group freed three of the hostages, while 
executing the fourth after the British government’s refusal to pay a ransom.180 A 
primarily Mauritanian and Algerian group, this attack marked the beginning of expanded 
kidnapping-for-ransom operations perpetrated by AQIM. Later in 2009, Algeria and Mali 
started preparations for joint operations against AQIM elements operating near the 
border.181 A handful of attacks against Malian military targets occurred throughout the 
year, resulting in the death of dozens of Malian soldiers.182 Regional cooperation 
continued throughout the following year as Mali, Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger 
established a joint command to conduct operations against AQIM.183 These initiatives 
produced limited results and AQIM continued to expand operations throughout the 
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Sahel.184 As of late 2010, AQIM continued its attacks against Malian forces, kidnapping 
a soldier and a customs guide.185 The inadequate responses by the states, coupled with 
AQIMs increased proficiency and zeal permitted the group to capitalize on the instability 
that the “Arab Spring” and the fall of the Qadaffi regime in Libya brought to the region.  
 
Figure 7.  Mali after 2012 Coup.186  
As AQIM violence increased throughout the Sahel, continued discontent among 
the ethnic Tuareg population in the north of Mali eventually converted into a full-fledged 
rebellion. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a politico-
military organization, began operations in Northern Mali in November 2010 (originally 
as the National Movement of Azawad (MNA)). While the nationalist credentials of 
MNLA are debatable given their varied cultural and social history, the group does cite a 
general distrust in the government as their reason for proposed recognition as a separate 
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entity.187 Their detailed list of grievances all speak toward the limited state capacity and 
illegitimacy of the government in Bamako, with allegations of corruption, socioeconomic 
destabilization, and police brutality some of the more egregious; a rather damning 
assessment of a country that was long championed by Western countries as a democratic 
beacon in the Sahel. The return of Tuareg rebels from Libya in late 2011, along with the 
uptick in arms trafficked from Libya, provided the MNLA with significant experience 
and armament.188 These linkages demonstrate the importance of regional cooperation and 
the dangers posed by the porous borders that define much of the Sahel.  
A few months after the establishment of MNLA, leadership quarrels and 
ideological differences emerged resulting in the Salafi-Jihadist group Ansar al-Dine 
breaking away from MNLA.189 Ansar al-Dine, which translates to “defenders of the 
faith,” is a Tuareg-led terrorist organization that operates in Northern Mali with the 
expressed intent of establishing Sharia law throughout all of Mali. Led by Iyd Ag Ghaly, 
a prominent figure with ties to AQIM, the group originally aligned with the MNLA but 
extremist views eventually led to the groups becoming antagonists. Despite the 
antagonistic relationship, Ansar al-Dine reportedly avoids direct confrontation with 
MNLA to avert the bloodshed of fellow tribe and family members. While the MNLA 
initially worked together with the Islamist group to dispel Malian forces from the region, 
ideological differences eventually caused this cooperation to cease. Like MNLA, AQIM 
saw a splinter group emerge in 2011 because of ideological differences about criminal 
activities and AQIMs dedication to jihadist ideals.190 The Movement for Unity and Jihad 
in West Africa (MUJOA) is an offshoot of AQIM that primarily operates in Mali, but has 
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been linked to attacks outside Mali.191 The first attack credited to MUJAO occurred in 
October 2011, when they kidnapped three aid workers from a refugee camp in Tindouf, 
Algeria, near the confluence of Mauritania and Mali’s borders. This attack (along with 
other suspected attacks) prompted the United States to list MUJAO as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization in December 2011, citing their connection to “violent terrorist attacks and 
kidnappings in the region.”192  
In March 2012, Ansar al-Dine was responsible for an attack against Malian 
soldiers that resulted in the execution of 82 Malian soldiers. A month later MUJAO 
operatives kidnapped seven Algerian diplomats outside the consulate in Gao, followed a 
few months later by the kidnapping of a Portuguese citizen in northern Mali.193 In 
addition to these attacks against Algerian government institutions, MUJAO engaged in 
attacks against mosques and shrines in Timbuktu, Mali, under the pretense that these 
mosques and shrines represent an affront to Islam (shirk).194 These kidnappings for 
ransom as a terrorist tactic and funding measure link their ideological origins to AQIM. 
In addition to ideological links, logistical links exist. The main spokesperson for MUJAO 
and Ansar al-Dine, Omar Ould Hamaha, has established ties to AQIM, displaying the 
interconnectedness of all these groups.195 Therefore, while these groups may not agree on 
tactics, they certainly exhibit a willingness to work together toward the common goal of 
establishing an Islamic State that operates under strict Sharia Law. In addition to showing 
how the Salafi-Jihadist ideology co-opts local grievances, these splits from MNLA and 
AQIM illustrates the difficulty in tracking down the leadership of these organizations as 
they constantly morph and splinter.  
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In 2012, insecurity in Mali skyrocketed, along with terrorism. In the span of a few 
months Mali suffered a coup d’état, an ethnic insurgency, and a land grab by AQIM. 
Tuareg disaffection in the north — simmering for decades — capitalized on the chaotic 
political environment and, after the MNLA quickly dispelled Malian security forces from 
the North, proclaimed an independent state.196 The coup and the subsequent MNLA 
declaration “laid bare deep inefficiencies and inadequacies of the state apparatus,” which 
AQIM quickly exploited.197 Despite ideological differences, MNLA and AQIM 
coordinated their operations to repel government forces from Northern Mali. Quickly 
overwhelmed, Malian forces lost control of two-thirds of the country within a matter of 
weeks. The cooperation was short lived as an Islamic coalition of AQIM, Ansar-al Dine, 
and MUJAO turned on MNLA, forcing them to cede large swaths of territory.198 
Subverting MNLAs goal of a sovereign and secular Azawad state, these Salafi-Jihadist 
groups began to establish an Islamic state under Sharia law.199 Jihadist fighters from 
outside the Sahel began to flow into Mali to assist these Islamists in setting up Sharia law 
and battling French forces conducting Operation Serval.200 While French forces easily 
repelled the jihadists, their initial operational successes and coordination illustrated a new 
dimension of terrorism in the Sahel. Likewise, the rapid implosion of Mali shocked many 
international observers, calling into question the efficacy of the United States’ 
counterterrorism efforts.  
After a decade of countering terrorism, by the end of 2012 there were four loosely 
affiliated Salafi-Jihadist terrorist organizations operating inside Mali. These groups were 
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responsible for an estimated 140 terrorist attacks inside Mali between 2012 and 2014.201 
The interconnectedness of these Islamist groups results from opportunistic and resilient 
leadership. These groups seemingly re-brand and align as necessary, all the while 
maintaining an ability to launch well-organized and deadly attacks against Western 
interests and local governments. One of the most inexhaustible of these jihadists is 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, nicknamed the “Marlboro Man” for his tobacco smuggling 
activities. Belmokhtar has been an active Salafi-Jihadist fighter throughout the region as a 
member of the GSPC—later AQIM—and eventually as the leader of the al-Mulathamun 
Battalion—Signed in Blood Battalion (AMB). The al-Mulathamun Battalion split from 
AQIM in late 2012 after Mokhtar Belmokhtar disagreed with AQIM leadership over 
tactics and targets that did not specifically target Western interests.202 Quickly 
establishing a high operational tempo, the al-Mulathamun Battalion was responsible for 
the January 2013 attack on the BP-owned In Amenas gas facility in southeastern Algeria. 
The attack and the ensuing four-day siege resulted in 39 civilian deaths — including three 
American citizens.203 Personal accounts from the attack illustrate that the perpetrators 
were specifically targeting westerners, looking for American, British, and French 
citizens.204 In May 2013, the al-Mulathamun Battalion was also involved alongside 
MUJAO for near simultaneous suicide attacks on a military base in Agadez, Niger, and a 
French connected uranium mine in Arlit, Niger.205 This apparent merger of al-
Mulathamun with MUJAO to form the new al-Murabitoun terrorist group, likely the 
result of losses suffered after the successful Operation Serval, illustrates the dynamic 
nature of these terrorist groups. Although accounts differ on the extensiveness of this 
merger, the Department of State designed the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 
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December 2013.206 Upon designating the group a Foreign Terrorist Organization, the 
Department of State described al-Murabitoun as “the greatest near-term threat to U.S. and 
international interests in the Sahel,” citing its “stated intent to attack Westerners and 
proven ability to organize complex attacks.”207  
While these groups share ideological backgrounds, each group started with a 
localized grievance against a government. However, the years of fighting against 
Sahelian governments, U.S.- and French-led coalitions, and the rise of global Salafi-
Jihadist groups likes ISIS have begun coalescing these groups. This further undermines 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region, as the cross-border aspect of these aligned 
groups only widens the battlefield. As efforts to improve the regional coordination of 
local governments appears to be failing; just the opposite seems to be occurring across 
the Sahelian terrorist network as disparate organizations claim allegiance to ISIS. As 
recently as May 2015, reports emerged that MUJAO leader Adnan Abu Walid al Sahrawi 
declared allegiance to ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.208 Of note, Boko Haram leader 
Abu-Bakr Shekau issued a similar statement of allegiance in March 2014.209 While 
AQIM has not aligned with ISIS, due to the complicated and widening schism between 
Al-Qaeda and ISIS, the group continues to champion the same cause of establishing an 
Islamic caliphate.210 Whether these alliances will continue is unknown; likewise, what 
tangible benefits these groups derive from such pledges of allegiance remains disputed. 
While these variables speak to the dynamic nature of global terrorism, one thing is 
certain—the Salafi-Jihadist groups in the Sahel are expanding their political platforms.  
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Long considered an example of stability within the region, Mali is one of the 
longest standing recipients of U.S. counterterrorism funding in the Trans-Sahara. Prior to 
the coup, defense spending in Mali fluctuated little from pre-TSCTP levels, changing 
from 1.6% of the GDP in 2000 to 1.4% of the GDP in 2013, and now stands at $154 
million.211 However, during that same time period military manpower decreased 
significantly. Shortly after U.S. counterterrorism activities began in 2003 there was a 
20% decrease, followed by a second, sharper decrease in 2011 from 12,00 to 7,800.212 
Taken together, these decreases represent an astounding 48% decrease — the largest in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.213 The sharp decrease in military manpower is likely the result of a 
complex set of political and economic changes occurring in Mali at the time, but it is 
notable because the decrease in capacity coincided with the return of Islamic radicals 
from Libya and directly preceded the events that led to the coup d’état.214 Armament 
imports into Mali did contain a number of combat vehicle and aircraft from European 
countries, with none coming from the United States.215 As one of the United States’ 
original counterterrorism partners, Mali has exhibited little demonstrable improvement 
over their military or state capacity. Assessing the root causes of Mali’s collapse, a report 
by Netherlands Institute of International Relations also noted that Malian leadership 
characterized Malian ownership of counterterrorism programs as weak, noting how “local 
embezzlement and a lack of regional cooperation have weakened the overall results of 
these efforts.”216 The case illustrates the difference between short-term success and long-
term success and the difficulty of institutional change.  
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Recent events demonstrate the continued effectiveness of the numerous Salafi-
Jihadist groups operating in Mali. In the beginning months of 2015, these groups 
“claimed responsibility for the bombing of a United Nations” convoy; a shooting that 
killed two European peacekeepers and three Malian officers; a deadly rocket attack in 
Kidal; and a thwarted attack on a military compound.217 These attacks represent the latest 
in an increasingly violent northern Malian region that remains largely out of control of 
the central government in Bamako. While the United States’ suspended non-humanitarian 
assistance to Mali following the 2012 coup, the suspension ended in September 2013 
after successful democratic elections.218 However, the weakened Malian state continues 
to struggle with absorbing the counterterrorism initiatives and turning them into palpable 
changes. Similar to the situation in Mauritania, the combination of security objectives and 
political aims comes into conflict as Mali continues to dig out of the chaos unleashed by 
the 2012 coup.  
C. AQIM IN MAURITANIA 
In contrast to the situations in Nigeria and Mali, Mauritania (see figure 8) offers a 
counterterrorism success story for the region, albeit an unstable one. After years of 
deadly attacks perpetrated by Islamic radicals, there have not been any terrorist attacks on 
Mauritanian soil since December 2011.219 As an original member of the Pan-Sahel 
Initiative, Mauritania has been a beneficiary of United States counterterrorism assistance 
since November 2002. During this time, Mauritanian governance could easily be 
characterized as challenging. In addition to the exogenous threat posed by Islamic 
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insurgencies, endogenous problems as coups, military rule, chronic insecurity, and 
debilitating poverty all challenged successive governments. In addition to a challenging 
political and military environment, there are implications for counterterrorism assistance 
resulting from the United States’ policy to suspend non-humanitarian assistance to 
countries not under democratic rule.220 Despite this, Mauritania has avoided the surge in 
violence that has plagued Mali and Nigeria over recent years. Inter alia, a complex set of 
political, military, social, and geographic factors are responsible for the situation. The 
situation provides a compelling case study to contrast against those of Mali and Nigeria, 
both of which are subject to repeated terrorism from Salafi-Jihadists.  
 
Figure 8.  Map of Mauritania.221  
While the history of Mauritania has hardly been a model of stability, terrorism in 
Mauritania is largely the result of external influences rather than homegrown 
insurgencies. As the only Islamic Republic in the Sahel, Mauritania maintains a complex 
relationship with the larger Islamic community, which at various times has served as an 
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impediment and an advantage in combating radical Islamic ideologies. Since 2000, the 
most threatening terrorist group has been AQIM née the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC). GSPC arose from the chaotic political and military landscape of Algeria 
in the 1990s, where numerous Islamist groups fought the Algerian military for control of 
the government.222 While the GSPC may have originated in Algeria, operations quickly 
spread into neighboring Mauritania and its neighbors as the group publicly embraced al-
Qaeda’s idea of global jihad.223 In March 2002, the GSPC was designated a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization by the Department of State, that at the time acknowledged that 
they were “among the most active of the twenty-seven groups commonly listed under the 
aegis of bin Laden’s network.”224 After its initial incarnation as an anti-government 
organization, the group, led by the notorious Abdelmalek Droukdel, went through a 
number of ideological changes and expanded operations to include attacks against 
civilians, smuggling, and trafficking.225 The now infamous Mokhtar Belmokhtar—a.k.a. 
Marlboro Man due to his smuggling activities—led the battalion that operated in 
Mauritania and the Algerian-Malian border.226 He was also one of many influential 
figures with ties to Mauritania. Many at the time dismissed the group as nothing more 
than smugglers and bandits, accusing the Algerian government and the United States of 
exaggerating the threat to further their own interests. While the exact magnitude of the 
threat that GSPC posed (outside of harassing Algerian security forces) remained unclear, 
GSPC certainly expanded operations. Strengthening their ties with al-Qaeda, the group 
formally re-branded itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2007. While the group’s 
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influence has waxed and waned over the years, their continued existence and perpetual 
comebacks is indicative of the trouble with counterterrorism efforts in the region.  
In 2002, when the Pan-Sahel Initiative launched, Mauritania was under the rule of 
President Maaouiya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, a former Army colonel who took power via 
coup d’état in 1984.227 The fact that President Taya came to power via a coup 
foreshadowed the difficulties that the United States faced in Mauritania as they attempted 
to balance security goals and political objectives in the war on terror. After numerous 
failed coup attempts, there was a successful attempt in 2005 that saw the end of President 
Taya’s rule, the institution of a military council, and the introduction of a constitutional 
amendment limiting presidential power to two five-year terms.228 At this time, the first 
evidence of al-Qaeda affiliated violence occurred when suspected al-Qaeda operatives 
killed fifteen Mauritanian soldiers at an outpost in the Saharan region of Eastern 
Mauritania.229 The GSPC posted a message on their website taking credit for the attack 
stating that it was “revenge for our brothers who were arrested by the apostate 
Mauritanian regime over the recent period and as a support for the oppressed Muslims 
there.”230 As the opening salvo in the Salafi-Jihadist insurgency that would soon engulf 
the entire region of the Sahel, this event made clear that GSPC was not only willing and 
capable of attacking outside of Algeria, but also that they were recruiting outside of 
Algeria. These realizations, along with a number of other notable attacks against western 
interests in Algeria, provided the impetus for the United States to expand the Pan-Sahel 
initiative into the more comprehensive Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.  
In 2007, after two years of military rule, President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi 
became the country’s first democratically elected president. Within the year, Mauritania 
                                                 
227 “Mauritania Profile-Timeline,” BBC, May 27, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
13882166.  
228 Christoper Boucek, “Mauritania’s Coup: Domestic Complexities and International Dilemmas,” 
Carnegie Endowment, August 2008, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/boucek_mauritania.pdf. 




230 Ibid., 20.  
 72 
began to see the Islamic violence linked to the newly branded AQIM expand as four 
French tourists were murdered in the central Mauritanian town of Aleg.231 The murders 
were the first incidence of violence against western interests that occurred in Mauritania 
and it stressed through the nascent political system. It was followed shortly afterwards by 
an unsuccessful attack on the Israeli embassy in the capital city Nouakchott. Although 
less spectacular than the earlier high profile attack on the United Nations Headquarters in 
Algiers, these attacks severely impacted the Mauritanian tourist economy and damaged 
the country’s profile as a safe, moderate Muslim nation.232 The ineffectual response from 
the Mauritanian government after the earlier murder of Mauritanian soldiers likely 
emboldened local AQIM leadership, already believing Mauritania a soft target due to its 
vast, desolate desert geography. Both these factors point toward the importance of state 
capacity when developing a successful counterterrorism program. At the time, Mauritania 
had been receiving U.S. counterterrorism assistance from the United States for over five 
years; however, the episodic nature of coups and military rule that characterized the 
political system stymied efforts to increase state capacity.  
Mauritania’s first step toward democracy proved to be difficult, with President 
Abdallahi accused of abuses of power, being soft on Islamists, and attempting to create a 
family dynasty for political power.233 In keeping with their turbulent political history, an 
August 2008 military coup toppled President Abdallahi—effectively ending the short 
experience in democracy.234 The coup was followed a few weeks later by the murder of 
twelve Mauritanian soldiers by AQIM operatives.235 The incident highlighted a number 
of enduring problems that faced Mauritania, largely because of the perpetual political 
chaos that defined the country. Weak border security, an underestimation of the threat 
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posed by Salafi-Jihadists, and limited counterterrorism assistance all correlate with the 
constant upheaval within the government. In the aftermath of the incident, the United 
States declined to assist in the hunt for the perpetrators because the military junta had 
removed President Abdallahi, again putting the United States’ counterterrorism goals in a 
precarious position vis-à-vis political objectives. The June 2009 killing of American 
missionary worker Christopher Leggett in a crowded market in Nouakchott again 
highlighted the increasing reach of AQIM.236 The sheer brazenness of the attack was as 
shocking as the fact that the group had killed an American citizen—both elements 
pointed toward an increased confidence and determination within AQIMs leadership. Not 
long afterwards, in July 2009, Gen Mohamed Ould Abdel-Aziz—leader of the 2008 
coup—won the election and was installed as Mauritania’s president. A few months after 
the elections, AQIM kidnapped three Spanish aid workers, who were all released after the 
Spanish government purportedly paid large ransom payments.237 A month later AQIM 
again targeted western interests, kidnapping two Italian tourists, also later released after 
diplomatic negotiations and an unconfirmed ransoms.238 While all the hostages were 
eventually released unharmed, the incidents further widened the scope of AQIM 
operations in Mauritania, damaging their international reputation and severely restricting 
tourism. At the time, some suggested that the United States counterterrorism efforts in the 
region were actually attracting jihadists where there was none before.239 Certainly the 
dialectics of “near” and “far” enemies represent a component critical of the narrative that 
AQIM pushes, presenting difficulties for the United States as it attempts to bolster state 
capacity without maintaining a large presence that Salafi-Jihadists invariably use as 
evidence of western meddling. 
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After the unprecedented violence that marred Mauritania in 2009, there were 
relatively few attacks perpetrated in 2010. This lull was likely the result of the hardline 
that President Abdel-Aziz, a staunch secularist, adopted against Islamic terrorism. Almost 
immediately after taking office, President Abdel-Aziz enacted a national counterterrorism 
law that defines “terrorism as a criminal act, describes court procedure in terrorism cases, 
and prescribes punishment for perpetrators.”240 While this may have been a politically 
calculated maneuver to assuage western political leaders uncomfortable with supporting 
another former coup leader, it was a step in the right direction toward strengthening 
institutions necessary to counter terrorism. AQIM activities in Mauritania were limited to 
a single suicide bombing at a military checkpoint, which is relatively low when compared 
to the numerous attacks perpetrated by AQIM in Mali and Niger during the same time 
period.241 Additionally, Mauritania prosecuted a record number of suspected terrorists—
fifty-six—with punishments ranging from fines to the death penalty.242 Along with this, 
Mauritania undertook efforts to improve border security through the establishment of ten 
additional checkpoints along the borders with Algeria and Mali.243 All of these 
improvements are the result of increased state capacity in areas of security, bureaucracy, 
legislation, and the judiciary.  
The trend continued into 2011 as Mauritania significantly increased its regional 
interoperability and coordination. Joint operations between Mali and Mauritania to 
counter the transnational movement of AQIM were successful in the Wagadou forest 
region.244 Additionally, Mauritanian military units were training with their Algerian 
counterparts in the Kidal region of Algeria — most likely in operations designed to 
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counter AQIM.245 Despite these improvements, the year was not without incident as a 
gendarmerie was abducted, and a suicide truck bombing was foiled in Nouakchott, along 
with an attempted assassination plot against President Abdel-Aziz.246 These events 
revealed two major trends. First, that Mauritanian forces were becoming increasingly 
more capable of repelling attacks by AQIM. Second, that AQIM was not ready to give up 
on their attempts to destabilize Mauritania through terrorism and the exploitation of the 
disenfranchised population. Many of these attacks, like those in earlier years, featured 
involvement from Mauritanian citizens.247 As a turning point, 2011 proved to be the year 
that Mauritania needed to bolster its image in the region and internationally. From a 
regional perspective, it showed the durability of AQIM as they soon increased their 
efforts in neighboring Mali and nearby Niger.  
While 2012 continued the peaceful trend in Mauritania, the March coup d’état in 
neighboring Mali and the subsequent Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali provided AQIM 
with a safe haven from which to operate unchecked. At the time the Commander of 
USAFRICOM, General Carter Ham, acknowledged that AQIM was “ an organization of 
growing concern” and “that the linkages between AQIM and Boko Haram are probably 
the most worrisome in terms of the indications we have that they are likely sharing funds, 
training and explosive materials that can be quite dangerous.”248 This characterization of 
AQIM alongside the revelation of possible ties with Boko Haram put a question mark on 
the efficacy of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. After all, by this point almost ten years of 
funding and training had been doled out for Trans-Saharan countries to fight AQIM. 
However, the effective disruption of AQIM activities in Mauritania shows that as 
individual states increase their capacity they can offer an effective, although limited, 
challenge to the lure of Islamic extremism. It also shows the fluidity of the situation as 
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the groups seek opportunities elsewhere, which underscores the importance of regional 
collaboration.  
The increased acumen of Mauritania’s military and police coupled with the recent 
boost in regional cooperation certainly decreased AQIMs operations in Mauritania. 
However, these efforts all addressed the symptoms of terrorism, rather than addressing 
the root causes. In this regard, President Abdel-Aziz began making progress as well. 
Instituting a de-radicalization program that aimed to co-opt the non-violent Islamic 
opposition that suffered repression under previous leaders was an important first step. In 
addition, the development of a counter narrative began in earnest in 2013. The 
Mauritanian Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education began educating 
former mahadra—Quranic school students—in a variety of occupational subjects at 
centers throughout the country.249 Programs like this, that train Islamic scholars to offer a 
narrative to counter that offered by the Salafi-Jihadists, illustrate the importance of state 
capacity. Furthermore, they address the root causes of terrorism that Salafi-Jihadists 
depend on for recruitment. When one considers that Mauritania fundamentally acted as a 
rear-base for AQIM operations and recruitment after the violence subsided in 2010, the 
importance of attacking the root causes becomes understandable.  
The June 2014 elections in Mauritania that saw the re-election of President Abdel-
Aziz suffered from low voter turnout and an opposition boycott; despite these problems, 
the United States and other Western governments welcomed the results, presumably 
because of President Abdel-Aziz’s successful counterterrorism program.250 If so, this 
illustrates that a focus on counterterrorism efforts trumps democratization and efforts to 
establish rule of law, something that critics have longed worried about leading to 
increased danger of political unrest. Years of steady improvements in economic freedom 
and integration into the global economy have done little to counter widespread corruption 
and a judicial system that is highly vulnerable to political influence. Mauritania’s defense 
expenditures have fluctuated over the past decade and their current military budget of 
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$149 million currently accounts for 4% of the GDP, slightly more than a 1% increase 
over 2000 spending. Mauritania purchases most of their arms from Europe, with recent 
purchases mainly comprised of transport aircraft.251 Because of the coups in 2005 and 
2008 and U.S. restrictions on arms sales, the United States has sold no major armaments 
to Mauritania over the past decade. Manpower changes have seen Mauritania’s military 
workforce increase slightly from 20,700 personnel to 20,870 personnel, a 0.82% increase 
over the past decade.252 These measurements show that Mauritania’s success does not 
come from an overwhelming militarized police state. Rather this data illustrates that the 
capacity of the state to counter terrorism has increased under the rule of President Abdel-
Aziz and the long-term counterterrorism assistance from the United States and France.  
This absence of terrorist attacks since 2011 has led some to speculate that 
Mauritania is the first Sahelian country to reach a post-Islamic insurgency period.253 
While Mauritania has not experienced the same surge in violence and terrorism that 
Nigeria and Mali have seen in the years since 2009, declaring terrorism defeated is 
premature for a number of reasons. First, historically a number of key militants operating 
elsewhere in the Sahel came from Mauritania even though they did not carry on attacks 
within the country.254 Recent data suggests this trend continues, which suggests that in the 
eyes of Salafi-Jihadists, Mauritania’s position has transformed into a base for, rather than 
a target of, Islamic extremism. Considering that Mauritania is the only Islamic Republic 
in the Sahel—its citizenry is one hundred percent Muslim—and it is home to some of the 
most inhospitable geography in the region, this idea has credibility. In March 2015 the 
Homeland Security News Wire recounted how ISIS and al-Qaeda may be training 
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together in camps located in the barren deserts of eastern Mauritania.255 Similarly, 
Veryan Khan, writing for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, described 
Mauritania as “a powder keg very few people are talking about.”256 These warnings 
illuminate the difficulty of defeating terrorism in the Sahel and the elusive nature of 
terrorists operating throughout the region that have little interest in established borders or 
ruling governments. Second, the crisis in Mali very likely provided an opportunity for 
many Salafi-Jihadists to leave Mauritania in search of a more winnable cause. If true, 
there is some reason to celebrate in Nouakchott since their counterterrorism response 
likely played a role in making operations difficult in Mauritania, encouraging terrorists to 
conduct attacks elsewhere. It appears that the government in Nouakchott considers these 
explanations valid as it continues de-radicalization programs and maintains an active role 
in stabilizing Mali.257 Both initiatives suggest that Mauritania remains aware of the threat 
posed by Salafi-Jihadists operating in the region.  
Perhaps the most salient warning for a potential resurgence in terrorism is the 
socioeconomic situation. Mauritania remains a chronically poor state that suffers from a 
host of socioeconomic ills that have the potential to undermine the recent gains in 
countering terrorism. Mali saw a similar lull in the years preceding the 2012 coup d’état, 
where a number of socioeconomic fissures that lay dormant for years converged to send 
Mali into chaos. The country continues to struggle with high levels of extreme poverty, 
corruption remains entrenched in the judicial and legislative systems, and health and 
disease issues overwhelm the country’s healthcare system.258 These factors present 
significant challenges for the leadership in Nouakchott and provide opportunities for 
violent extremist ideologies to take hold among the disenfranchised population. 
Considering Mauritania’s historical struggles with good governance and legitimacy, it is 
                                                 
255 “Training Camps in Mauritania Train Foreign Recruits for ISIS, al-Qaeda,” Homeland Security 
News Wire,  March 26, 2015. http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150326-training-camps-in-
mauritania-train-foreign-recruits-for-isis-alqaeda.  
256 Ibid.  
257 “UN Extols Mauritania Role in Mali Crisis,” Star Africa, February 4, 2015. 
http://en.starafrica.com/news/un-extols-mauritania-role-in-mali-crisis.html.  
258 “United Nations Development Report 2013,” World Health Organization, April 20, 2015, 
http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccsbrief_mrt_en.pdf. 
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plausible that the violence has yet to end. This threat underscores the importance of 
tackling development alongside defense whenever possible, especially in the realm of 
counterterrorism operations where the symptoms are as importance as the cause.  
In conclusion, Mauritania presents a rather unique case in the milieu of the Trans-
Sahara. The chaos that defined Mauritania’s political system from 2002 through 2009 
correlates with the height of terrorist activity within the country. Likewise, the relative 
political calm that defined the period after 2009 was the result of various factors that 
worked to strengthen state capacity. U.S. counterterrorism funding has spearheaded a 
number of initiatives specifically designed to bolster the security, administrative, legal, 
and infrastructural capacities of the government in Nouakchott. From programs designed 
to improved anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing to programs designed 
to develop border security and cooperation during the crisis in Mali, U.S. 
counterterrorism initiatives have demonstrated an understanding of the underlying causes 
that support and sustain many terrorist organizations. Despite the strong design of 
counterterrorism initiatives like the TSCTP and the substantial funding associated with 
counterterrorism assistance in Northwest Africa, evidence suggests that the ability of the 
state to absorb and transform the assistance into demonstrable change makes all the 
difference. The presidency of Abdel-Aziz, despite its non-democratic beginnings and 
authoritarian tendencies, has produced some of the best counterterrorism results in the 
Sahel. This is, in large part, due to the government’s ability to capitalize on 
counterterrorism assistance from the United States and France to increase its capacity.  
D. SUMMARY  
The lessons from these case studies underscore the importance of a state’s 
capacity when addressing the Salafi-Jihadist threat. The foremost lesson is that the United 
States cannot overlook the capacity of the recipient state in the pursuit of 
counterterrorism objectives. Not only does it hamper the long-term goals of United States 
counterterrorism assistance, but it also plays directly into the narrative being offered by 
Salafi-Jihadist organizations. The situations in Nigeria, Mali, and Mauritania, while 
unique and varied, all illustrate the link between state capacity and the effectiveness of 
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counterterrorism initiatives. In Nigeria, the government of Goodluck Jonathan 
represented the neo-patrimonialism that defines post-colonial governments throughout 
the region. These patronage practices—coupled with challenging demographics—alienate 
large segments of the society, providing jihadists with a supply of recruits and 
challenging the developing counterterrorism capacity of the state. Mali presents a 
different set of circumstances: the government in Bamako failed to capitalize on the 
significant funding that resulted from Mali’s status as a democratic star in the region. The 
developing counterterrorism capacity was not accompanied by socioeconomic or political 
reform, thereby limiting the states ability to counter the ideological spread of Salafi-
Jihadism. These limitations, exacerbated by the stark geography that defines much of the 
country’s north, paved the way for the events that unfolded after the coup in 2012. 
Meanwhile Mauritania showed that an autocratic leader can be a significant advantage 
when countering terrorism because of the ability to marshal resources and direct political 
will toward a specific cause: in this case, developing a counterterrorism capacity. 
However, the case of Mauritania, where AQIM still operates from within, also illustrates 
the difficulty of long-term solutions and the need for regional collaboration. Throughout 
the case studies, it is apparent that underdeveloped state capacity undermines 
counterterrorism initiatives.    
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite steadily increasing funds, an increasingly expansive geographical 
footprint, and the creation of a combatant command, U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 
Sahel have not stopped the rise of Salafi-Jihadist terrorism. While suffering some 
setbacks, AQIM continues to operate with impunity. Meanwhile, Boko Haram, MUJAO, 
Ansar al-Dine and others have come into existence and now represent significant regional 
threats as recent attacks by Boko Haram in Chad illustrate.259 Moreover, the states of the 
Sahel remain mired down by structural issues resulting from weak economies, poor 
governance, and social grievances. The situation that unfolded after the 2012 coup d’état 
in Mali illustrated the deep fissures that existed beneath the democratic façade of the 
state. Likewise, the persistent and increasingly violent upheaval in Nigeria illustrates how 
a large economy does not necessarily improve the underlying conditions that terrorism 
exploits. Considering that U.S. counterterrorism initiatives in the Trans-Sahara were 
designed to “enhance the indigenous capacities of governments” so they could “confront 
the challenge posed by terrorist organizations” these situations show that the programs 
have not been successful.260 This paper finds that this failure is not the result of ill-
defined goals, the militarization of Africa partners, or a lack of strategic interest on behalf 
of the United States. The failure primarily results from the United States not having 
accounted for the limited capacity of the states within the Sahel.  
The limited capacity of the recipient states to absorb and capitalize on the 
counterterrorism assistance hinders efforts and emboldens terrorist organizations. In the 
beginning stages of counterterrorism operations in the Trans-Sahara, the Sahelian 
countries received counterterrorism assistance with little ability to effectively apply it and 
little regard to its long-term utility. Likewise, the United States lacked mechanisms to 
measure the effectiveness of the counterterrorism assistance. In addition, the recipient 
states did not necessarily subscribe to the whole of government approach that the United 
                                                 
259 “Chad Troops Kill 19 Insurgents After Boko Haram Raid on Army Post,” Agence Free Presse, 
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260 “Country Reports: Africa Overview,” United States Department of State,  June 11, 2014, 
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States promoted. However, in an effort to quickly align with the U.S.-led and western 
supported fight against global terrorism, a number of weak states in the Trans-Saharan 
region declared they had a terror problem. The politically astute and shrewd African 
leaders quickly understood that there were political, economic, and material benefits to 
alignment. The pre-9/11 international environment was a unipolar world where the 
United States was the sole, undisputed superpower and many African politicians saw an 
opportunity to increase their political economy. Likewise, the United States was quick to 
accept and champion any professed allies in the emerging war against terrorism. In the 
rush to court one another, policy makers on both sides failed to account for the effects 
that limited state capacity would have on counterterrorism efforts.  
Salafi-Jihadism has been particularly virulent in the region because its ideological 
foundations center on the corruption and illegitimacy of the secular state: a notion that 
spreads easily in areas where the state’s limited capacity makes it appear incapable or 
unwilling to serve the citizenry. Furthermore, these organizations operate in regions of 
the state largely outside the reach of the central government. Capitalizing on the limited 
reach of the state, these organizations exploit the resulting porous borders, presenting 
additional challenges for the state’s capacity. For these reasons, the Salafi-Jihadists 
operating in the Sahel may remain a challenge for the international community, regional 
organizations, and local leaders until the countries of the Sahel increase their capacity.   
Considering the importance of state capacity in countering terrorism, it is likely 
that the states of the Sahel will struggle with Salafi-Jihadism for some time. The ability to 
develop a state’s capacity simply exceeds the scope and design of current U.S. initiatives 
in the region. Furthermore, developing state capacity relies heavily on the ability of the 
United States and its partners to realize the sometimes-contradictory nature of security 
and politics. Nigeria and Mauritania provide examples of how counterterrorism goals in 
the Sahel do not always fall in line with political goals—a divergence that has 
implications for the development of a state’s capacity. In Nigeria, President Jonathan was 
roundly regarded as doing little to stop the rising violence of Boko Haram and the 
Nigerian Security Forces were routinely accused of committing human rights abuses. 
Both instances put the United States on cautious footing regarding the amount of 
 83 
counterterrorism assistance Nigeria would receive and which units would receive it. 
Likewise, in Mauritania, the political and humanitarian issues that plagued the Abdel-
Aziz presidency called into question the wisdom of U.S. counterterrorism assistance. 
Conversely, the situation in Mali highlights how the achievement of political goals can 
gloss over security issues. Perhaps most alarming, these cases show how a government’s 
failure to develop the whole capacity of state can actually strengthen, and in some cases, 
enable terrorist ideologies to spread.  
In the Sahel, Salafi-Jihadists have successfully exploited the limitations in state 
capacity and U.S. policies. As such, the United States’ counterterrorism initiatives need 
to evolve in step if they are going successfully counter these organizations. Any such 
evolution will require a reassessment of the approach that considers the weak state 
capacity prevalent throughout the region. This may require a re-balancing of funding to 
funnel more toward socioeconomic issues or the possibility of working through regional 
organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) rather 
than directly with host governments. Additionally, it may require the United States to 
prioritize its security goals over its political goals. Considering the counterterrorism 
initiatives in the Trans-Sahara resemble initiatives elsewhere, the implications of policy 
changes are far reaching. However, in the challenging and dynamic environment of 
counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, this thesis argues no amount of U.S. aid—
counterterrorism or otherwise—brought into the region will ever replace the need for 
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